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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Reporting period from 22 June to 6 November 2017

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my report of 11 July 2017 (S/2017/591), including on specific provisions of Council resolution 2373 (2017). During the reporting period, the situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained generally calm. However, there was no progress with regard to the outstanding obligations of the parties under resolution 1701 (2006) or towards a permanent ceasefire.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. Israeli and Lebanese authorities continued to reaffirm their commitment to resolution 1701 (2006) and the cessation of hostilities. Despite the relative calm along the Blue Line, the level of tensions between Lebanon and Israel remained high, with rhetoric on both sides that resulted in increased anxiety, including among the local population. The United Nations continued to urge both parties to refrain from potentially inflammatory comments and to utilize established liaison channels to address concerns.

3. On two occasions, tensions rose across the Blue Line and required UNIFIL intervention and liaison with the two sides to avert escalation. On 9 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL of the presence of suspicious equipment near Kfar Shuba (Sector East), in the Shab'a Farms area. When UNIFIL arrived at the location, the device, a fragmentation explosive, had been partially dismantled and moved. The UNIFIL investigation found that the Lebanese Armed Forces had violated the Blue Line when removing the device from south of the Blue Line. The incident led the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, to warn during a speech delivered on the occasion of Ashura that such actions, which he attributed to Israel, were not acceptable and to voice Hizbullah's determination to look for ways to address the issue if it was not resolved by political means.

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4. On 19 September, the Israel Defense Forces alerted UNIFIL that a Lebanese soldier had thrown stones at the Israeli technical fence close to one of their positions south-west of Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West). The soldier had taken up an armed alert position in anticipation of a reaction by the Israel Defense Forces. UNIFIL quickly intervened to prevent escalation. The Lebanese Armed Forces redeployed and disciplined the soldier.

5. During a visit to UNIFIL headquarters on 11 September, the Minister of Defence of Lebanon, Yacoub Riad Sarraf, voiced his Government's support for UNIFIL in the implementation of its mandate and commitment to close cooperation and coordination between the Mission and the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Minister also informed UNIFIL that the Fifth Intervention Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces would deploy to southern Lebanon imminently. During the visit of the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, to UNIFIL on 22 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces formally announced the deployment of the Regiment, in line with assurances by the Lebanese authorities that the Lebanese Armed Forces would increase its presence in the south as soon as security conditions along the eastern border allowed. The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces also agreed to establish a coordination committee to explore ways to further enhance the implementation of mandated tasks. A more visible Lebanese Armed Forces presence, coordinated with UNIFIL, south of the Litani River, particularly along potential areas of tension near the Blue Line, will contribute to mitigating the risk of serious incidents.

6. From 1 July to 30 October, UNIFIL recorded 420 ground violations of the Blue Line, similar to levels observed during the same period in 2016.

7. More than 90 per cent of the observed ground violations were committed by shepherds with their flocks or farmers cultivating their fields; the majority near the Shab'a Farms and Bastrah (Sector East) and Rumaysh (Sector West). Nine per cent of violations involved crossings to access the Shoeib well (Sector East) near Blida.

8. UNIFIL completed its investigations into the firing incident across the Blue Line in the Kfar Kila area (Sector East) on 26 October 2016 (see S/2017/201, para. 12), the crossing by a Lebanese man into Israel near Kfar Kila on 27 April 2017 (see S/2017/591, para. 10), and the suspicious device found in the area of Kfar Shuba on 9 September. In the conclusions and recommendations of the investigations, the need for close and timely liaison and cooperation by the parties with UNIFIL was emphasized.

9. Israel continued to violate Lebanese airspace on a daily basis, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty. From 1 July to 30 October, UNIFIL recorded 758 air violations, totalling 3,188 overflight hours, an increase of 80 per cent compared with the same period in 2016. Unmanned aerial vehicles were involved in over 93 per cent (707) of those violations; the remainder involved fighter or unidentified aircraft.

10. UNIFIL protested all air violations to the Israel Defense Forces and urged their immediate cessation. The Government of Lebanon also protested the airspace violations to UNIFIL. Such violations of Lebanese sovereignty undermine the cessation of hostilities and efforts to reach a permanent ceasefire.

11. The Israeli occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line continued, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty. To date, Israel has not responded to the proposal that UNIFIL submitted to both parties in 2011 aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel

Defense Forces from the occupied area. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL in July 2011 of the agreement of Lebanon to the proposal.

12. Lebanon also protested alleged violations of its sovereignty by Israeli vessels operating near the Israeli line of buoys. The delineation of the maritime boundary between the two countries is still disputed; Lebanon considers that the line of buoys, installed unilaterally by Israel, runs through its territorial waters and does not recognize it. The United Nations also does not recognize the line of buoys. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, which is mandated to assist the Government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other entry points, maintained a visible presence in the southern part of the area of maritime operations to prevent tensions between Israel and Lebanon.

13. Lebanon also asserted that Israel continued to violate its sovereignty by conducting electronic surveillance, both across the Blue Line and through devices placed on Lebanese territory.

14. In accordance with resolution 1701 (2006), UNIFIL continued to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL. The Force stands ready to act within the full scope of its mandate and capabilities should there be credible evidence or information supporting the presence of unauthorized weapons or the imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from the area of operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces regularly reiterated its strong commitment to act immediately upon receipt of evidence of unauthorized armed personnel or weapons in the area in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006).

15. UNIFIL observed 251 instances of individuals carrying unauthorized arms in the area of operations, comparable to the number in the same period in 2016. The majority (240) involved civilians carrying hunting weapons near the Blue Line in the areas of Mays al-Jabal, Blida and Bastrah (Sector East). On 25 September, the Lebanese Armed Forces reissued a public statement prohibiting hunting and the presence of weapons south of the Litani River. An association of local hunters, supported by local politicians, protested the ban, disputing its legality under resolution 1701 (2006).

16. The remaining incidents involved other weapons, mostly assault rifles, observed in the area of operations (see annex I). In each instance, UNIFIL alerted the Lebanese Armed Forces and requested that they take appropriate measures to prevent the presence of unauthorized weapons. The Lebanese Armed Forces continues to follow up on such incidents to prevent their recurrence.

17. In addition, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL about the alleged presence of Hizbullah weapons and infrastructure in three specified locations in the UNIFIL area of operations. On 9 August, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, in a letter addressed to me, referred to the same "three Hizbullah installments" and requested an update on follow-up actions by UNIFIL. The locations include an area on the northern boundary of the UNIFIL area of operations, a privately-owned house and an open compound in a village. UNIFIL shared the information with the Lebanese Armed Forces command. Within the parameters of its mandate, UNIFIL closely monitored the three locations, including through air reconnaissance, satellite imagery and patrols. UNIFIL shared the information with the Lebanese Armed Forces command and cross-checked its findings with the Lebanese Armed Forces. Subsequently, the findings were shared with the Israel Defense Forces. No evidence to confirm the allegations was established. UNIFIL continues to regularly monitor those areas.

18. On 24 August, UNIFIL discovered an abandoned underground structure near the Blue Line in the vicinity of Yarun (Sector West). The structure was not in an operationally viable condition. An excavation of the site by UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces confirmed no evidence of weapons at the scene. The Lebanese Armed Forces determined that it had been long disused, and destroyed the structure.

19. Through tripartite forum discussions and bilateral engagement with UNIFIL, Israel raised the issue of "suspicious" individuals in civilian attire, alleged to be Hizbullah operatives, conducting "reconnaissance" of areas south of the Blue Line. UNIFIL observed and closely monitored individuals taking photographs of areas south of the Blue Line and the work of an environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), "Green without Borders", operating in the area. On 20 June, the Permanent Representative of Israel referred to that organization as conducting illicit activities and violations on behalf of Hizbullah (see S/2017/526). UNIFIL verified the credentials of the NGO with the Lebanese authorities and received official confirmation of the organization's proper accreditation and environmental purpose. On 29 August, UNIFIL observed that members of the NGO had tampered with barbed wire near a Blue Line marker and referred the issue to the Lebanese authorities to prevent such incidents from reoccurring. In the conduct of its operations, UNIFIL observed no unauthorized weapons or other violations in relation to the organization, including with reference to the above-mentioned incident. UNIFIL continues to monitor concerned areas regularly.

20. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL was generally respected, except on eight occasions (see annex II). In each case, UNIFIL responded within its mandate, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces and local authorities, and subsequently ensured its freedom of movement in the incident locations.

21. In a number of villages, for instance, Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West), narrow roadways and community sensitivities necessitated that patrols be conducted on foot. In other instances, for example in Blida, community leaders have requested that patrols conducted with heavy armoured vehicles pass through main roads only, owing to road safety concerns. In some areas, the potential presence of unexploded ordnance poses a security risk. Private property or difficult and rugged terrain also limit access by UNIFIL patrols. Where the conduct of patrols in heavy vehicles is not feasible, officers from the liaison branch and unarmed military observers from Observer Group Lebanon or the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, as well as UNIFIL personnel on light vehicle and foot patrols, are deployed to achieve unimpeded access throughout the area of operations. In addition, such areas are monitored by regular helicopter patrols. UNIFIL maintains close contact with the leadership of local communities and the Lebanese Armed Forces to enhance situational awareness and address any local sensitivities without compromising its mandated tasks. UNIFIL has no access to the northern part of the village of Ghajar and the adjacent area, which remain occupied by the Israel Defense Forces.

22. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2373 (2017), UNIFIL increased its visible presence and activities, with a focus on preserving the cessation of hostilities. UNIFIL closely monitored the situation from fixed positions along the Blue Line and maintained a high operational tempo; more than 22,686 mobile vehicular and foot patrols were completed from 1 July to 26 October across the area of operations. UNIFIL adjusted its operational priorities, increasing the percentage of patrols, including by foot and during night-time, conducted along the Blue Line, from 27.5 per cent in July to 33.5 per cent in October. UNIFIL also conducted over 141 hours of helicopter patrols from July to October, including over rugged and difficult terrain. Those operational adjustments contributed to improved Mission visibility, in particular close to the Blue Line and in sensitive areas.

23. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL regularly review their modus operandi to further improve their close coordination. UNIFIL conducts 19 per cent of its operations with the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese Armed Forces also increased their participation in patrols along the Blue Line.

24. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force carried out maritime interdiction operations on a 24-hour basis and capacity-building for the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy. During the reporting period, the Maritime Task Force hailed 2,908 vessels, of which 708 were inspected and cleared by the Lebanese authorities.

25. Relations between UNIFIL and the local population remained largely positive; UNIFIL continued its outreach and engagement with local communities. The Mission continued to identify and implement quick-impact projects to address pressing needs of local communities, support the extension of State authority and contribute to acceptance of the Force. In addition to the UNIFIL-funded quick-impact projects, individual contingents carried out 30 projects focused on electricity, education, water, the environment, social assistance, the local economy and health.

26. The Mission continued to engage with a range of stakeholders to build the capacity of State institutions, such as the civil-military cooperation capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces, civil defence volunteers, the Internal Security Forces and the municipal police, including in the implementation of the Mission's strategy for the protection of civilians.

27. In line with the priorities identified by the Lebanese Armed Forces during the strategic review of UNIFIL (see S/2017/202), UNIFIL is working closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces to establish a Lebanese Armed Forces civil-military cooperation centre in Marj'yun (Sector East).

B. Security and liaison arrangements

28. UNIFIL chaired two tripartite meetings, on 31 July and 19 September. While acknowledging a sustained period of stability along the Blue Line, the Israel Defense Forces expressed concern about the aforementioned suspicious Hizbullah activity, involving individuals in civilian clothes taking photographs along the Blue Line and the activities of "Green without Borders." The Lebanese Armed Forces protested the continued Israeli air violations and the occupation of northern Ghajar by Israel. During both meetings, the parties underscored their continued commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), including respect for the Blue Line, and to maintain stability, as well as voicing their willingness to explore paths towards a permanent ceasefire.

29. UNIFIL and the parties made extensive use of other established liaison and coordination arrangements to exchange information and facilitate conflict prevention. The liaison and coordination provided by UNIFIL enabled the quick de-escalation of tensions across the Blue Line. UNIFIL continued to explore with the parties ways to further enhance the effectiveness of liaison and coordination. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, Israel, was discussed with the Israeli authorities. The agreement of Israel to the UNIFIL proposal remains pending.

30. UNIFIL continued its efforts to advance progress in the visible marking of the Blue Line. With the majority of points agreed upon by the parties having been marked, UNIFIL continued to encourage progress in marking the remaining points. Now in its tenth year, the Blue Line marking process remains an important confidence-building activity with significant strategic value.

31. As mentioned above, the Lebanese Armed Forces reinforced its presence in the South Litani Sector with the deployment of the Fifth Intervention Regiment. The 950–1,000-strong unit joined the two brigades already operating south of the Litani River. It is deployed centrally in an area straddling Sectors East and West of the UNIFIL area of operations. With the Regiment's arrival, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces are in the process of adjusting their operational coordination to incorporate the strengthened Lebanese Armed Forces presence.

32. UNIFIL continues to work closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy in maritime interdiction operations inside Lebanese territorial waters in an effort to build up Lebanese Armed Forces Navy capabilities. The Lebanese Armed Forces Navy has limited capacity to deploy units in Lebanese territorial waters. Small units with limited crew capabilities able to operate in calm weather can be deployed for up to 24 hours. The Lebanese Armed Forces Navy maintains a current maritime picture of its waters through the coastal radar system. To ensure that at least one Lebanese vessel is at sea operating together with the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force at all times, the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy requires at least three vessels and trained crews, which are not currently available. As highlighted in the 2017 strategic review of UNIFIL and concomitant with the planned reduction of the Maritime Task Force from seven ships to six in January 2018, the Lebanese authorities are seeking to acquire a suitable offshore patrol vessel.

33. UNIFIL conducted 194 training activities on maritime operational issues, contributing to improved common operational standards between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

34. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued to engage in the strategic dialogue process, which seeks to support the development of the capabilities and presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and Lebanese territorial waters and constitutes an integral part of the capabilities development plan for the Lebanese Armed Forces. In cooperation with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, UNIFIL continued efforts to promote international assistance with donor countries in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces deployment in the UNIFIL area of operations, including at the eleventh coordination meeting of the Executive Military Commission, held on 29 June.

35. In line with the recommendations of the strategic review of UNIFIL and through the strategic dialogue, UNIFIL intensified consultations with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces on the elaboration of a "model Lebanese Armed Forces regiment". On 22 September, during his visit to UNIFIL headquarters, the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces expressed his full commitment to establishing the model regiment, which will cooperate closely with UNIFIL, in particular along the Blue Line. This model regiment is distinct from the aforementioned Fifth Intervention Regiment.

36. Building on the identified priorities and recommendations of the strategic review of UNIFIL and with a view to implementing resolutions 1701 (2006) and 2373 (2017), UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, enhanced its engagement with the Lebanese authorities towards the extension of State authority and presence and building the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and Lebanese territorial waters, including through the International Support Group for Lebanon. In that regard, consultations continued with Member States and the Government of Lebanon to galvanize international support for Lebanese security institutions, especially in relation to priority land and maritime capabilities.

37. In line with its strategic priority to ensure that it is prepared to deliver on its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, UNIFIL

completed contingency planning at the tactical level and commenced targeted training on the protection of civilians for all Mission personnel. UNIFIL focused on a range of preventive actions to maintain calm along the Blue Line and in the area of operations. An update on the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review is provided in annex III.

C. Disarming armed groups

38. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups continues to restrict the ability of the Government of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. Hizbullah demonstrated its possession of weapons and military equipment through military operations, including its battle against militants from Jabhat Fath al-Sham on the outskirts of Arsal between 21 and 27 July, during which 28 Hizbullah fighters and approximately 150 militants were killed, as well as in statements.

39. Illustrating the heightened rhetoric during the reporting period, in a speech on 23 June, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Hassan Nasrallah, stated that "the door would open for tens of thousands of mujahidin from the Arab and Muslim worlds to be partners in this battle", should Israel attack Lebanon. On 13 July, the Head of the Executive Council of Hizbullah, Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, reportedly stated that "Hizbullah has significant ability to show many new capabilities" in the context of a potential future confrontation with Israel. On 13 August, Mr. Nasrallah expressed a veiled threat against the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona. On 1 October, Mr. Nasrallah threatened that there would be "not a safe place in occupied Palestine" in the event of Israeli aggression.

40. On 23 September, in an interview with the French media, the President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, reportedly stated that "one cannot deprive Hizbullah of its weapons as long as Israel does not respect the resolutions of the UN Security Council", and that Hizbullah's weapons "serve to ensure our resistance to the State of Israel".

41. The media reported statements by Israeli officials pertaining to the use of force against targets in Lebanon, the relationship between Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces and Hizbullah, and alleged Iranian weapons facilities in Lebanon. On 28 August, the Minister of Defence of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, reportedly said that "Israel will act with great force during a confrontation" in which Israeli citizens were attacked. On 24 September, the media quoted the Minister of Education and of Diaspora Affairs, Naftali Bennett, as having stated that Israel would "use full force on the Lebanese Government and infrastructure" if attacked. Mr. Bennett also made statements equating Lebanon with Hizbullah. On 10 October, Mr. Lieberman reportedly alleged that "the Lebanese army has turned into an integral part of Hizbullah's command structure".

42. Mutual accusations of violations of resolution 1701 (2006) continued. In identical letters addressed to me and the President of the Security Council dated 9 August 2017 (A/71/1031-S/2017/705), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations rejected allegations made by the Permanent Representative of Israel in his letter of 20 June 2017 (S/2017/526) with respect to the environmental NGO "Green without borders", noting that the association was licensed by the Lebanese State and was not in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). In a letter dated 31 August, the Permanent Representative of Israel alleged "continued involvement with Hezbollah" by a major in the Lebanese Armed Forces, which the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations refuted in a letter dated 9 October 2017. In letters addressed to the President

of the Security Council dated 8 September and 30 October 2017 (S/2017/772 and A/72/553-S/2017/915), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon denounced Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace on 7 September "to strike targets in the Syrian Arab Republic". In identical letters addressed to me and the President of the Security Council dated 11 September 2017 (A/72/499-S/2017/773), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon denounced an Israeli overflight on 10 September over the city of Sidon, in which Israeli aircraft flew at low altitude and broke the sound barrier. The Israel Defense Forces characterized a flight of their aircraft in Lebanese airspace on 16 October as "routine".

43. The Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces intensified arrests of individuals suspected of affiliation with extremist groups or of involvement in terrorist activities throughout Lebanon. From July to the end of October, 226 terrorism-related arrests were reported, including of suspected affiliates of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat Fath al-Sham. Several weapons caches were also uncovered.

44. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada, which continue to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and effectively control parts of the border.

45. While the security situation in the majority of Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon remained generally stable, violence in the Ein El Helweh camp between extremist groups and the joint Palestinian security forces remains of serious concern. Between 17 and 23 August, 8 people were killed and 86 injured and around 400 families were displaced following intense clashes. Heavy weapons were reportedly used, including mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. Extensive damage to infrastructure, particularly shelters, created a precarious humanitarian situation. Basic service delivery in the camp by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) had to be suspended temporarily. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon stressed the need to work collectively for the stability of the camp during her meeting with the camp's political factions in Ein El Helweh on 25 July.

46. Intermittent incidents of violence, often linked to criminal activity, occurred in other camps, including Beddawi, Burj Barajneh and Shatila. In the Nahr el-Bared camp, in northern Lebanon, there have been recurrent protests since mid-August in which UNRWA has been called upon to resume rental subsidies discontinued owing to a lack of funding in October 2015 for the families displaced by the 2007 clashes.

D. Arms embargo and border control

47. Allegations of arms transfers to Hizbullah continued on a regular basis. The United Nations takes such allegations seriously, but is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

48. During my visit to Israel, on 28 July, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, raised the issue of alleged "intentions to build factories for the production of precision-guided missiles in Syria and Lebanon" of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Prime Minister accused the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hizbullah of "breaking international law by using civilians as human shields and shooting at civilians".

49. On 30 June, the Lebanese Armed Forces raided informal Syrian refugee settlements at Arsal. During the operation, five suicide bombings and a hand grenade explosion lightly injured seven Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers. One

Syrian child was reportedly killed. Of the 356 individuals arrested for interrogation during the operation, 4 died while in the custody of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In line with the obligations of Lebanon under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Saad Hariri, ordered an investigation on 5 July. On 24 July, the Military Prosecutor concluded that the detainees had died of "natural causes" and that there was "no evidence of violence". Pictures of corpses attributed to the four Syrians circulating on social media showed extensive gashes and bruising. Neither the report nor the details of the investigation have been made public.

50. In the context of the military operations against militants along the north-eastern border, incidents of cross-border fire from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon temporarily spiked. After protecting the town of Arsal from militant infiltration, the Lebanese Armed Forces launched a military operation against ISIL militants on the outskirts of Ra's Baalbeck and Qa' on 19 August. At the same time, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and Hizbullah attacked ISIL militants on the Syrian side of the border. The operation ended with a ceasefire announced by the Lebanese Armed Forces on 28 August. The remains of nine Lebanese soldiers abducted in August 2014 were recovered by the Lebanese Armed Forces between 27 and 29 August. Following the departure of the militants, the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic. Lebanese security agencies assess that consequently the security situation along the border has improved.

51. Agreements between non-State armed groups resulted in the departure of Syrian fighters and their families from border areas in Lebanon to the Syrian Arab Republic, totalling between 6,000 and 7,000 persons according to media reports. On 2 August, fighters affiliated with Jabhat Fath al-Sham and their families reportedly left for Idlib, Syrian Arab Republic. Following the surrender without fighting of Saraya Ahl al-Sham on 22 July, hundreds of fighters and their families reportedly departed on 14 August. Moreover, hundreds of ISIL-affiliated fighters and their families reportedly departed on 28 August towards Dayr al-Zawr, Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations was not involved in the returns and could not confirm the intentions or the numbers of those who left for the Syrian Arab Republic. Two movements of people affiliated with Saraya Ahl al-Sham totalling 235 persons in June and July 2017 were partially monitored by the United Nations.

52. Hizbullah remained engaged in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic. It was reported in the media that a number of Lebanese nationals also continued to fight with non-State armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic.

53. On 25 September, the Prime Minister of Lebanon launched an initiative to limit the risk posed by the hazardous use of firearms, including for commemorative or celebratory shooting.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

54. Areas on the outskirts of Arsal are contaminated with landmines following the militant presence. Seven Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers were killed by mines during the military operation in August, and one civilian was reported to have been killed and another to have been wounded on 28 September. Mine clearance continues as part of the plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces to fully redeploy to the area.

55. Six UNIFIL mine clearance teams cleared 779.3 m2 of land in the UNIFIL area of operations. The Mine Action Service of the United Nations conducted 22 quality assurance visits and 25 training and safety monitoring visits to UNIFIL

demining teams. Safety training and awareness briefings with respect to landmines and other explosive remnants of war were provided to 61 United Nations civilian and military personnel. The Lebanon Mine Action Centre, in coordination with UNIFIL, held two mine risk education events that benefited over 400 children.

56. Two incidents involving landmines and unexploded ordnance were recorded in the UNIFIL area of operations: on 2 July, in Ramiyah (Sector West), the explosion of a cluster munition killed a farmer; on 6 September, a cluster bomb explosion injured the employee of an NGO clearing munitions near Tayr Harfa (Sector West).

F. Delineation of borders

57. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, including in uncertain or disputed areas, such as the outskirts of Arsal, that recently witnessed fighting. There was no progress in addressing the matter of the Shab'a Farms. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641).

G. Political and institutional stability

58. On 4 November, in Riyadh, the Prime Minister of Lebanon announced his resignation. The President of Lebanon subsequently issued a statement that he would await the return of the Prime Minister to Lebanon to determine next steps, while underlining the importance of national unity. On 5 November, I issued a statement to express my concern about this development, urge all sides to support the stability of Lebanon and the continuity of State institutions, and reiterate the commitment of the United Nations to the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

59. Preparations for parliamentary elections scheduled for May 2018 continue. In line with the electoral calendar, the supervisory commission for elections was formed on 14 September and its budget was approved on 6 October. Parliamentary approval is pending for the decision by the Cabinet of 17 September to introduce a biometric card system, "voter megacentres" to allow voters to vote in their area of residence rather than registration, and out-of-country voting. On 2 October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched online voter registration for the Lebanese diaspora. On 12 October, the Cabinet approved an electoral budget of $46.5 million. With regard to municipal elections, a bill was passed on 19 September that could boost married women's participation by allowing them to run in their own, not only their spouses', districts of origin.

60. On 20 October, Parliament passed the State budget for 2017. Other Cabinet and parliamentary decisions included raising the salary scale for civil servants, in conjunction with increased taxes. Tax legislation pertaining to petroleum-related activities was also passed.

61. The Higher Defence Council met regularly, including on 8 August to endorse the Lebanese Armed Forces operation against ISIL militants on the outskirts of Ra's Baalbeck and Qa', and on 8 September to endorse the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces on the eastern border. Both the Prime Minister and the President have underlined the need for continued vigilance with regard to the terrorist threat.

62. The Government of Lebanon, with the support of the United Nations, continues efforts to develop a national strategy for the prevention of violent extremism, in line with the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, presented in 2016. Following extensive interministerial dialogue, the strategy is being drafted, in parallel with preparations for inclusive consultations with national stakeholders.

63. On 19 September, as recommended by the Committee against Torture, established under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Lebanon adopted a new law criminalizing torture. Some civil society actors criticized the law for not fully meeting international standards. In the fight against gender-based violence, on 16 August the Parliament abolished article 522 of the Criminal Code, which allowed rapists to be discharged from prosecution if they married their victims.

64. Lebanon continued to be affected by the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic; as at 30 June 2017, 1,001,051 Syrian refugees were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The economic vulnerability of Syrian refugees in Lebanon continued to rise. Preliminary results of a socioeconomic survey conducted by UNHCR, the World Food Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund in 2017 show that 58 per cent of the refugees live in extreme poverty (an increase of more than 5 per cent from 2016) and 74 per cent live below the poverty line. As at 3 October, the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan was only 33 per cent funded (compared with 43 per cent at the same point in 2016). The current underfunding puts critical programmes in the health, education and water and sanitation sectors at risk.

65. Despite over $5.8 billion in donor contributions since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, most Lebanese feel that vulnerable Lebanese have been neglected by the international assistance. The United Nations inter-agency stability monitoring survey, however, shows that international assistance has reduced tensions in municipalities benefiting from direct assistance.

66. Anti-Syrian refugee sentiment is on the rise in the media and in the political discourse. In 2014, 40 per cent of respondents to a survey among refugees and host communities reported no tension between these communities; in 2017, only 2 per cent reported no tension. A marked increase in protests over Syrian labour competition was reported across Lebanon, leading to a wave of shop closures and municipal curfews. The United Nations and different Lebanese ministries have been working on messages to reduce tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.

67. In a letter addressed to me dated 16 October, the President of Lebanon warned of the "existential challenge" that Syrian refugees posed for Lebanon and called upon the United Nations and the international community to "exert all possible efforts and provide the appropriate conditions for the safe return" of Syrian refugees, and requested that such return not be "correlated to any political solution". The Government is expressing a sense of saturation and the need to prepare the gradual return of refugees, in coordination with the international community and with respect for international law, including the principle of non-refoulement. Frequent surveys conducted by UNHCR in Lebanon reflect that Syrian refugees in Lebanon overwhelmingly wish to return once it is safe for them to do so.

68. According to World Bank projections, the medium-term economic prospects for Lebanon remain stagnant owing to the ongoing impact of the Syrian conflict, coupled with limited progress on reforms. The Government has highlighted the capital investment plan as a vehicle for the creation of jobs, thus addressing a main driver of tensions in the country. Announced as part of the Government's vision at the Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, held in

April 2017, the plan identifies projects relating to infrastructure and service improvement worth $13 billion, which it seeks to fund through public-private partnerships, concessional loans and bilateral assistance. Donors have called for the plan to be complemented by structural reforms.

69. An estimated 65 per cent of Palestine refugees registered and living in Lebanon and 90 per cent of Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic live below the poverty line. All are heavily dependent on UNRWA assistance, given significant restrictions on their employment and property rights and their access to public services in Lebanon. Findings of an official census of Palestine refugees in Lebanon are expected to be released by December. On 20 July, the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee launched a strategy paper entitled "A unified Lebanese vision for the Palestinian refugees affairs in Lebanon".

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

70. UNIFIL continually reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures, taking into account security threat warnings, and closely coordinated with the Lebanese authorities. In the Arqub area (Sector East), strict security measures, including the use of armed escorts, remained in place for movements by United Nations personnel. Meanwhile, commemorative and celebratory shooting continue to pose a threat, both to the local population and to UNIFIL personnel. Furthermore, owing to armed clashes between 17 and 23 August in the Ein El Helweh camp for Palestine refugees in Sidon, situated along the main supply route connecting the UNIFIL area of operations with Beirut, UNIFIL had to adjust its movements and utilize alternative routes.

71. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in the Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL. With regard to the attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent in 2007, a hearing at the Permanent Military Court was rescheduled from 5 July to 27 November. In the case of terror intent, opened in January 2014, the Court held a hearing on 5 July; the next hearing is scheduled for 27 November. In the case of an attempted serious attack against UNIFIL in 2008, in which one of the four sentenced perpetrators filed an appeal, hearings scheduled for 9 May and 2 November 2017 before the Military Court of Appeal were adjourned; a new hearing is scheduled for 6 February 2018. In three investigations launched into the serious attacks perpetrated against UNIFIL on 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011, additional judicial instructions were issued. In the case of a homicide committed in 1980, when three UNIFIL peacekeepers from Ireland were shot dead, a hearing at the Permanent Military Court was held on 26 July; the next hearing is scheduled for 2 February 2018.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

72. As at 30 October, UNIFIL comprised 10,693 military personnel, including 457 women, or 4 per cent of the Force, from 41 troop-contributing countries; 246 international staff, including 82 women; and 585 national civilian staff, including 150 women. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised five corvettes, one fast patrol boat, one offshore patrol vessel, two helicopters and 756 of the Force's total military personnel, including 2 women. In addition, 51 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, including 5 women, serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL.

V. Conduct and discipline

73. UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon did not receive any allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse during the period under review. Both continued to enforce existing measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. In accordance with the UNIFIL internal and external communications strategy, all UNIFIL personnel and the local communities were informed of the expected standards of conduct for United Nations personnel and of how to report misconduct, in particular in relation to sexual exploitation and abuse. The United Nations country team network to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse in Lebanon continued to further develop information-sharing protocols and share best practices.

VI. Observations

74. I remain concerned about the lack of full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the unfulfilled obligations of Lebanon and Israel. Non-compliance increases the risk of tensions and possibly of hostilities. I call upon both parties to redouble efforts towards full adherence to resolution 1701 (2006) to bolster stability and prevent conflict. The continued commitment of Lebanon and Israel to resolution 1701 (2006) in word and in deed is of paramount importance.

75. The presence of unauthorized weapons in the hands of Hizbullah remains of serious concern. Hizbullah operations in the eastern border areas illustrate the extent of weaponry outside the authority of the State, and I note with concern the self-acknowledged use and display of that weaponry by Hizbullah. The presence of those weapons, together with threatening rhetoric from both sides, heightens risks of miscalculation and escalation into conflict. I call upon the parties to exercise restraint at all times.

76. UNIFIL continues to fulfil its mandate to assist the Lebanese authorities in establishing an area between the Litani River and the Blue Line free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL. I welcome the immediate and proactive steps that UNIFIL has taken to operationalize resolution 2373 (2017), including by maintaining a high operational tempo and adapting its posture and modus operandi to enhance the visibility and effectiveness of its operations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat and UNIFIL have also undertaken steps to ensure that the Security Council is provided with prompt, concrete and detailed reporting on violations of resolution 1701 (2006). The Secretariat will maintain close contact with the parties, Council members and troop-contributing countries in the implementation of resolution 2373 (2017).

77. As stipulated in resolution 1701 (2006), I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that, pursuant to the Lebanese Cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State. I reiterate my request to the Lebanese authorities for the resumption of the national dialogue, with the objective of formulating a national defence strategy that would address the presence of armed individuals and groups outside of State control. The Lebanese Armed Forces are the sole legitimate defender of the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. Earlier decisions of the national dialogue should be implemented, specifically those relating to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups

and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

78. I am equally concerned about continued Israeli overflights of Lebanese territory. The Israel Defense Forces continue to occupy northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line. These are clear violations of resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and reiterate my call for Israel to cease its violations of Lebanese airspace and to withdraw its forces from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

79. UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements are key to mitigating and de-escalating incidents, violations and tensions along the Blue Line. The calm along the Blue Line should not be taken for granted, especially against a backdrop of regional uncertainty. I call upon both parties to continue their active engagement with UNIFIL, to manage sensitive situations and to maintain stability and security for the communities living on either side of the Blue Line. The open and constructive exchanges in the tripartite forum, including on long-standing violations of resolution 1701 (2006), are testament to the commitment of the parties, as well as to their confidence in UNIFIL and the liaison and coordination arrangements.

80. Reinforcing the national institutions and army of Lebanon remains the best preventive measure against the risk of conflict. The Lebanese Armed Forces have proven to be a credible security actor. I commend their achievements and enduring commitment to the service of the security and stability of Lebanon. I pay tribute to the military personnel who have made the ultimate sacrifice in the fight against terrorism, and their families.

81. I am encouraged by the consolidation of the Lebanese Armed Forces deployment along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic and the Government's decision to deploy additional troops in the area south of the Litani River in the implementation of resolutions 1701 (2006) and 2373 (2017).

82. The deployment of the Fifth Intervention Regiment to southern Lebanon will enable more coordinated activities between the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL and will help to expand the authority of the State throughout Lebanese territory. I look forward to tangible progress in the establishment of the model regiment and an increase in the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon, as specified during the strategic review of UNIFIL. Investing in the Lebanese Armed Forces is investing in the stability of Lebanon.

83. The United Nations, including through the International Support Group for Lebanon, will continue advocating for international support for the Lebanese army and security institutions. The United Nations will, in connection, continue encouraging the Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces to advance additional deployments south of the Litani River and update the capabilities development plan, while adhering to the principles of accountability, independence and international human rights.

84. I condemn the movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese-Syrian border in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the shelling and shooting into Lebanese border areas from the Syrian Arab Republic. The lack of a delineated, demarcated Lebanese-Syrian border does not justify violations of Lebanese sovereignty by any party. I call upon all concerned to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

85. The stability of Lebanon remains a regional public good that must be shielded. The turmoil in the region continues to pose grave risks in this regard. Despite the efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces to secure the border with the Syrian Arab

Republic, Lebanese nationals continue to participate in the Syrian conflict. The participation of any Lebanese national in the Syrian conflict constitutes a breach of the policy of disassociation, pursuant to the Baabda Declaration agreed by all Lebanese political parties. I reiterate my call upon all Lebanese parties to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict.

86. The uncertain regional environment underscores the importance of the parties actively pursuing progress towards a permanent ceasefire. The United Nations remains ready to support efforts in this regard, and I encourage the parties to explore confidence-building measures with the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander.

87. I again encourage both parties to proceed with steps that would allow for the resolution of the dispute over the exclusive economic zone. I re-emphasize that the United Nations remains available to assist with the delineation of the exclusive economic zone between Lebanon and Israel, if both parties so request. I continue to urge the parties to adopt a constructive approach that would pave the way to the mutually beneficial exploitation of maritime oil and gas resources, which can serve as a much-needed confidence-building measure.

88. Progress towards the genuine reactivation of all Lebanese State institutions must be safeguarded. In the context of uncertainty following the offer of resignation by the Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, I count on all sides to focus their efforts on supporting the continuity of Lebanese State institutions in accordance with the Constitution and safeguarding the country's security and stability. In this regard, I appeal to all political stakeholders to sustain the positive momentum in preparations for the parliamentary elections. The new electoral law, agreed by the country's political parties in a spirit of compromise and in the national interest, is a notable achievement. Adherence to timely parliamentary elections is a matter of political stability, democratic tradition, and accountability to the citizens of Lebanon. I trust that any technical electoral matters will be addressed in a way that does not jeopardize adherence to the electoral date in May 2018. United Nations technical assistance to the electoral process remains available.

89. The meaningful participation of women in the electoral process is imperative. In the absence of mandated gender quotas in the electoral law, this hinges on the commitment of political parties to voluntary gender quotas and incentives. The support expressed in this regard by several political leaders is reassuring. I urge relevant decision makers to ensure the adequate representation of women in the upcoming elections, in line with commitments of Lebanon to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

90. I hope that the steps necessary to ensure the national human rights institution of Lebanon is fully staffed and functioning can soon be taken. While I welcome the newly adopted legislation on both torture and women's rights, I encourage more work to address outstanding legal gaps.

91. There is a risk that violent tensions will recur in Ein El Helweh so long as the underlying drivers of socioeconomic hardship, extremism and weapons proliferation are not addressed. I encourage efforts, including through greater donor support, to preserve stability in the camps and their environs and to ensure dignified conditions for Palestine refugees in Lebanon.

92. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and the resulting refugee presence remains an important challenge for Lebanon. I extend my appreciation to Lebanon and its Government for their hospitality and generosity in shouldering this presence. I am concerned about an increase in rhetoric that could incite a climate of hostility

and violence against refugees. I call upon the people and leadership of Lebanon to preserve their spirit of tolerance and coexistence that is characteristic of Lebanon.

93. The protection and dignity of refugees in Lebanon must be ensured until they can find durable solutions outside of Lebanon. Continued international assistance to refugees and host communities will be key in this regard. It is important to increase support to the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the predictability of its funding for 2018 and beyond and to mobilize longer-term development resources, especially in a context of social tensions and growing host community fatigue.

94. Returns organized between armed groups for fighters and accompanying civilians did not involve the United Nations and do not set the standard for future refugee returns. While some improvements in the security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic are noted, the situation remains unpredictable, with 1 million newly internally displaced in 2017. The resumption of registration by UNHCR would be important to appropriately prepare for voluntary, safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration.

95. I encourage discussions on international conferences in support of the stability of Lebanon, to provide the opportunity for the Government to share concrete details of its vision for the country's economic growth and sustainable development, and to secure further support from the international community.

96. I welcome the continued progress by the Government of Lebanon in the development of a national strategy for the prevention of violent extremism. I encourage more sustained efforts for its finalization in close collaboration with the United Nations and national and international partners.

97. The prevention of conflict, instability and socioeconomic crisis remains the imperative underpinning all United Nations efforts in Lebanon. The Special Coordinator will continue to exercise good offices on my behalf, with the dual goals of defusing tensions and identifying opportunities for confidence-building measures and progress towards stability. The parties carry a central responsibility in this regard. I call upon them to intensify efforts in pursuit of prevention and stability and to avail themselves of United Nations support in this regard.

98. I extend my appreciation to all countries contributing troops and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I thank the former Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Sigrid Kaag, upon the completion of her assignment, for her leadership and dedication in carrying out the important work of the United Nations in Lebanon. I commend the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Michael Beary, and the civilian and military personnel of UNIFIL, as well as the staff of the Office of the Special Coordinator, for their continued efforts.

Annex I

Unauthorized weapons in the area of operations not involving hunting weapons observed by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 22 June to 6 November 2017

1. On 23 July, a UNIFIL patrol observed a group of civilians near Majdal Silm (Sector West), one of whom was carrying a pistol.

2. On 9 August, UNIFIL reported two civilians near Qulay'ah (Sector East) traveling in a vehicle with an assault rifle.

3. On 13 August, UNIFIL reported a civilian in a vehicle travelling near Burj Qallawiyah (Sector East) with an assault rifle.

4. On 13 August, live television broadcasts showed the display of unauthorized weapons during a commemoration of the 2006 conflict in Khiyam (Sector East), including several assault rifles and a launcher. UNIFIL formally protested the incident to Lebanese Armed Forces.

5. On 19 August, UNIFIL observed an individual travelling near Sarda (Sector East) with a pistol in the vehicle.

6. On 29 August, UNIFIL observed a convoy of approximately 60 vehicles near Haris (Sector West). One civilian fired in the air using an assault rifle.

7. On 1 September, UNIFIL observed two individuals near Shama' (Sector West) firing an unidentified weapon.

8. On 2 September, UNIFIL observed two individuals carrying an unidentified automatic weapon and a short rifle in a vehicle near Ain al-Arab (Sector East).

9. On 1 October, UNIFIL observed an individual carrying an automatic assault rifle near Dibbin (Sector East).

10. On 9 October, UNIFIL observed two individuals carrying an automatic assault rifle in a civilian vehicle near Arab al-Wazzani (Sector East).

11. On 16 October, UNIFIL observed an individual with a handgun in the vicinity of Blida (Sector East). The municipal police confirmed the same day that the individual had been detained in connection with a robbery.

Annex II

Restrictions on the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 22 June to 6 November 2017

1. On 6 July, civilians confronted a UNIFIL patrol dispatched to investigate activities by civilians observed near Yarun (Sector West). A Lebanese Armed Forces patrol intervened after the civilians took the UNIFIL patrol's camera. The Lebanese Armed Forces investigated the incident and retrieved the camera the following day. Village patrols resumed on a weekly basis without incident.

2. On 17 July, after taking photographs of a UNIFIL patrol, civilians attempted to forcibly enter a stationary Mission vehicle near Udaysah (Sector East). Following the incident, operational activities resumed without interruption and UNIFIL enhanced its civil-military cooperation and outreach activities with the local communities and authorities.

3. On 24 July, in the vicinity of Khiyam (Sector East), civilians seized a camera from a UNIFIL civilian staff member who had accompanied a foot patrol. The Lebanese Armed Forces was informed about the incident, and the equipment was returned. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces met with local leaders after the incident and weekly joint village patrols resumed on 31 August, without further incident.

4. On 3 August, a motorcycle and a truck blocked a UNIFIL vehicle patrol near Blida (Sector East). Civilians reacted aggressively towards the patrol, taking some electronic equipment from UNIFIL personnel. Upon arrival at the location, the Lebanese Armed Forces restored calm. Since then, the equipment has been returned and UNIFIL activities have continued without incident, with UNIFIL enhancing its civil-military and outreach activities in the area.

5. On 5 August, civilian vehicles attempted to block a UNIFIL patrol near Kfar Kila (Sector East). A UNIFIL quick reaction team escorted the patrol back to its position. Foot patrols in the village have continued without incident. UNIFIL continues to liaise with local authorities on a range of issues, including on projects to assist a local medical facility.

6. On 19 August, around 100 civilians near Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West) surrounded a UNIFIL convoy, taking several items of equipment. The convoy left the area after the Lebanese Armed Forces intervened. Following the incident, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces met with the local authorities to de-escalate tensions. Most of the equipment taken was recovered. A few days later, a UNIFIL foot patrol was received positively by the community, and joint Lebanese Armed Forces-UNIFIL patrols have been conducted since without incident.

7. On 12 September, a group of individuals stopped a UNIFIL patrol dispatched to Sribbin (Sector West) to investigate possible gunshots. After negotiating with the group, UNIFIL departed the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. It was also clarified that the sounds were fireworks used during a community celebration. UNIFIL continues to follow up with local authorities to discuss steps to avoid similar incidents.

8. On 23 September, near Jumayjmah (Sector West), a group of individuals demanded that UNIFIL troops leave the village after a resident had invited them into his home. Before the UNIFIL troops departed, the group took cameras from them. The Lebanese Armed Forces arrived a few minutes later to escort the patrol out of the village. The seized equipment was returned the next day. UNIFIL has resumed regular operational activities in the village without incident.

9. On 19 October, two individuals in a vehicle approached an Observer Group Lebanon patrol as it was reversing back to the main road in the vicinity of Ayta al-Sha'b (Sector West). The Observer Group Lebanon team opened the door of their armoured vehicle to speak to the individuals, who briefly questioned them before taking telecommunications equipment from the interior of the vehicle. After the team had explained their activities, the equipment was returned and the patrol continued along the planned route. The Lebanese Armed Forces were informed. Observer Group Lebanon and UNIFIL have continued patrols in Ayta al-Sha'b on a routine basis in subsequent weeks without any incident.

Annex III

Update on the implementation of the recommendations of the 2017 strategic review of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

1. Further to the letter dated 8 March 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/202) communicating the strategic priorities and key recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the present overview provides an update on progress in the implementation of those recommendations.

Protection of civilians

2. UNIFIL intensified its liaison with interlocutors from the Government of Lebanon on the protection of civilians and continues close coordination with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. UNIFIL and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat have also agreed on guidelines for coordination between the Mission and the humanitarian country team.

3. UNIFIL reviewed its contingency plans, assessed the preparedness of civilian and military personnel in response to protection of civilians crisis situations in a series of "command post" and "table-top" exercises in June and November 2017, systematically briefed contingent commanders on protection of civilians requirements and ensured that contingents had no national restrictions on carrying out the protection of civilians mandate. As part of ensuring the overall Mission preparedness, UNIFIL designed and began rolling out one-day training modules on the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate for all personnel at headquarters and in sectors. The Mission support logistics plan was finalized and all relevant documents were updated.

Strategic dialogue mechanism

4. UNIFIL engagement with the Lebanese Armed Forces on all core aspects of Lebanese Armed Forces capacity-building continued. The UNIFIL Deputy Force Commander and the Deputy Head of Mission engaged jointly with the Lebanese Armed Forces on a range of coordination and capacity-building issues.

5. A concept of operations for the model regiment, including an initial set of benchmarks and timelines to measure progress, is under preparation.

6. Using its Coastal Radar Organization stations, the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy assumes the command of maritime interdiction operations in Lebanese territorial waters, including through a continuous presence at sea for a period of 72 hours each week. In addition, since early 2017, the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy regularly deploys one vessel during a 24-hour period each week in close coordination with the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force in proximity to Lebanese ports to conduct maritime interdiction operations. The presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy at sea is constrained owing to the unavailability of additional suitable vessels.

7. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force onshore and offshore training led to the establishment of a Lebanese Armed Forces Navy pool of instructors who, in turn, provide training to Lebanese Armed Forces Navy units on six core courses. Engineering courses aimed at enhancing maintenance capabilities will be added to the core curriculum in the next phase.

8. It was confirmed that the location of the Lebanese Armed Forces civil-military cooperation centre in the south would be in Marj'yun (Sector East), and technical work for the establishment of the centre is ongoing. UNIFIL facilitated the securing of funding from a troop-contributing country, complemented by quick-impact project funding for the refurbishment of the premises.

9. Discussions are under way, in close coordination with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, to hold a meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon dedicated to enhancing the capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces. The acquisition of an offshore patrol vessel by the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy remains a critical priority for the Lebanese Armed Forces Navy to gradually assume control of Lebanese territorial waters.

Liaison and coordination with the parties

10. The updating of all UNIFIL internal guidance is ongoing to ensure the optimal synchronization of actions by the Mission's assets in a crisis or in case of an incident in the area of operations.

11. As of August 2017, UNIFIL had strengthened its Liaison Branch, deploying a second Liaison Team permanently south of the Blue Line. UNIFIL continues advocating with Israeli authorities for the necessity of establishing a Liaison Office in Tel Aviv.

Structure of the uniformed and civilian components of the Force

Land forces

12. In the context of the deployment of the Fifth Intervention Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the UNIFIL area of operations in late September 2017, the UNIFIL Force Commander and Head of Mission and the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces agreed to establish a coordination committee to enhance joint activities, follow up on incidents in the area of operations and address other operational matters between the two forces.

13. A review of all memorandums of understanding for UNIFIL contingent-owned equipment identified efficiencies amounting to $5 million. Work is ongoing between UNIFIL and United Nations Headquarters to ensure that all memorandums of understanding are adjusted to effect the projected savings.

14. On the basis of the 2017 military capability study, UNFIL is conducting troop-to-task reviews in an effort to ensure that UNIFIL fulfils its mandated tasks optimally.

Maritime task force

15. Preparations are ongoing to reconfigure the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force into a six-vessel all-corvette fleet as of January 2018. Helicopter flight hours were reduced to 25 hours per month within the current budget cycle. The reduction of maritime personnel is expected to come into effect with the reconfiguration of the Maritime Task Force in January 2018.

Community outreach activities

16. UNIFIL made progress on all recommendations pertaining to community outreach activities. The community outreach board was established and held its first meetings, chaired by the Deputy Head of Mission, to address the Mission's outreach priorities at the strategic level. Terms of reference for the outreach board and the subcommittees on strategic communications and programmatic activities/projects were

finalized. Both subcommittees have taken up their regular work, supported by a secretariat. The concept of the local perception survey is undergoing review.

17. Work is ongoing to ensure that community outreach activities are planned and implemented Mission-wide in a coordinated and synchronized manner. To that end, the coordination mechanism between the Mission's civil-military cooperation branch (J9 branch) and the Force Commander's Civil-Military Cooperation Unit has been enhanced, and the Chief of the J9 branch briefs the military Chief of Staff daily.

18. The identification of suitable UNIFIL quick-impact projects, within the planning framework for the 2018–2019 budget cycle, is progressing. The aim of the process is also to ensure, to the extent possible, an equitable distribution of funds between the communities in the UNIFIL area of operations.

19. In June, UNIFIL established the Mission Strategic Communications Unit/Public Information Office to strengthen the coherence and delivery of UNIFIL strategic communications, headed by a Senior Officer (P-5), who reports to the Deputy Head of Mission. The Military Community Outreach Unit was reduced in strength from 55 to 25 personnel and merged into the Mission Strategic Communications Unit/ Public Information Office.

Budget and staffing

20. To further optimize its staffing, UNIFIL identified three posts (two National Professional Officer posts in the Civil Affairs Section and one P-2 post in the HIV/AIDS Unit) to be abolished.

Mission integration and coordination

21. UNIFIL established, within existing resources, a position of Mission Chief of Staff in the Office of the Head of Mission and Force Commander at the D-1 level. The temporary arrangement will be regularized in the 2018/19 budget.

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Letter dated 16 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of October 2017. It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued six notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in October 2017.

Turkey's actions are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

It should further be underlined that the continuation of Turkey's illegal actions creates tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

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Please recycle

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 16 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 October	1035–1245	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
	1212–1330	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
1–2 October	2024–0005	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
2 October	1000–1154	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1446–1610	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 October	0010–0222	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1100–1240	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
4 October	1240–1302	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1615–1639	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1927–1954	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 October	1035–1245	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1213–1330	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 October	0001–0015	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0140–0154	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
9 October	1447–1512	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1806–1822	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
9–10 October	2037–0023	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
10 October	0952–1043	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1124–1142	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1443–1447	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 October	0432–0938	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1530–1557	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1637–1704	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1852–2045	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
12 October	0937–1005	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1054–1356	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1122–1350	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1151–1401	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1357–1608	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1709–1802	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
13 October	0255–0353	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
14 October	1401–1602	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
15 October	1037–1521	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 October	0505–0630	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1012–1150	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1111–1220	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1459–1540	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 October	0307–0333	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0436–0532	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1028–1129	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1033–1221	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1106–1207	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1138–1211	Two F-16 Turkish military aircrafts infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1413–1513	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2026–2208	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
18 October	0447–0654	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0933–1223	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1034–1125	One "Huey" Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1340–1447	One "Huey" Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1100–1130	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
19 October	0925–1023	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1121–1345	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1450–1710	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
20–21 October	2248–0003	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 October	1037–1308	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1208–1537	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 October	1100–1201	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 October	1346–1503	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1411–1500	Two F-4 and four F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1438–1502	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 October	1155–1250	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1452–1550	Two AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1557–1723	Two Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1610–1710	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 October	0947–1224	One Beech-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1048–1316	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1134–1129	Two AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
28 October	0447–0817	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0604–0706	One Beech-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
30 October	0525–0917	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1129–1453	One Beech-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 16 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
2–4 October	One P-336 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6–8 October	One P-336 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
8–11 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
11–15 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
12–15 October	One S-353 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–17 October	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
17–18 October	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
19–23 October	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
23–24 October	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
24 October	One NL-124 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
24–26 October	One NL-124 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
25–26 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
26–27 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
31 October	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

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Letter dated 15 November 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Security Council, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 2367 (2017), called upon me to conduct, by 15 October 2017, an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), related resources, priorities, and areas in which it has comparative advantages and synergies with other United Nations entities, in order to ensure that the Mission and United Nations country team are configured to most appropriately and efficiently fulfil mandated tasks.

Following the adoption of the resolution, I established an independent external assessment team consisting of Anthony Banbury and Phillip Rawkins. The team conducted its work from 11 September to 8 November 2017, including a field visit to Iraq and Kuwait between 25 September and 11 October 2017. Pursuant to my exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council on 1 October, the deadline for completion of the assessment was extended from 15 October to 15 November 2017, for which I would like to reiterate my gratitude.

The team submitted its report on 9 November 2017. I am grateful to the team for the report and its recommendations, including for noting the "deep appreciation for the work of the United Nations among Iraqis. Perhaps the greatest asset that UNAMI has is the trust Iraqis place in it as a neutral, impartial actor, without any self-interest in Iraqi affairs. However, there is also a strong desire to see UNAMI do more, accomplish more and achieve more tangible results".

The report and its recommendations focus on the following key areas:

- Strategic priorities and strategy-setting
- Organizational structure
- Resources and staffing
- Collaboration and coordination between UNAMI and the United Nations country team
- UNAMI and United Nations country team common services and cost-sharing
- Performance measurement and reporting

I am attaching herewith for the attention of the Security Council, the executive summary, the observations and the full set of recommendations of the report as submitted by the team of experts (see annex). Also enclosed are several charts and tables that support the findings of the team (see enclosures*).

* The enclosures are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

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It is my view that the recommendations of the team are comprehensive and cover the areas mandated by the Council under resolution 2367 (2017). Some of the recommendations can be implemented relatively quickly and under my authority, while others will require further action or certain decisions by other bodies before they can be fully implemented, in line with the existing organizational policy and methods of work.

I have therefore requested that a group, led by the Department of Political Affairs and consisting of representatives of the Departments of Field Support and Safety and Security, as well as of the United Nations Development Programme, be established immediately at Headquarters to further review the report and its recommendations, with deadlines and clear responsibilities for action. I have further requested that the group, working closely with UNAMI and the United Nations country team, submit to me the outcome of the review with a view to developing an implementation plan by 12 January 2018.

I am guided by the overall priorities of the mandate implementation in support of the Government and people of Iraq, as well as the need to make efficient use of resources, while ensuring that the Mission is properly resourced and that the safety and security of the United Nations staff working in Iraq is addressed to the highest standard. Where appropriate, I will work with the governing bodies and keep the Council informed on steps and actions taken.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

Annex

Executive summary

In resolution 2367 (2017), the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General to conduct an independent, external assessment of the structure and staffing of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and of related resources, priorities and areas in which it has comparative advantages and synergies with other United Nations entities, in order to ensure that the Mission and United Nations country team are configured to most appropriately and efficiently fulfil mandated tasks. The report is the product of that assessment.

While the assessment focused on the role and operations of the United Nations in Iraq, by necessity the starting point for such an assessment must be an analysis and understanding of the situation in the country, the needs of the people and the views of the Government of Iraq and other stakeholders. It is only from such an understanding that the objectives and priorities for United Nations engagement within the existing mandate can be identified, roles defined and supporting structures and resource requirements proposed.

Iraq is facing a challenge unlike any in its history due to a confluence of political, security, economic and social crises. Some of these crises predate the territorial conquests and subsequent military defeats of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), such as the tensions between Iraq and Erbil. Other crises have contributed to the rise of ISIL and remain unresolved and threaten the future of Iraq, such as the lack of adequate representation of the Sunni population in the Government. Others were coincidental with the rise of ISIL, but have had a devastating effect on society, such as the dramatic fall in oil prices and its impact on the economy of Iraq. Still others are a product of the rise and fall of ISIL, such as the social cleavages and the psychological effects caused by the control, at one time, by ISIL over millions of Iraqis.

While military victories over ISIL are indeed a cause for Iraqis to celebrate, the challenges that the Government and the people of Iraq now face are unprecedented, enormous, interdependent and recalcitrant. A consistent theme that the assessment team heard in Iraq from Government officials and a range of stakeholders was that the United Nations is needed in Iraq, now more than ever.

There is deep appreciation for the work of the United Nations among Iraqis. Perhaps the greatest asset that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has is the trust Iraqis place in it as a neutral and impartial actor, without any self-interest in Iraqi affairs. However, there is also a strong wish for UNAMI to do more, to accomplish more and to achieve more tangible results.

In conducting the assessment, the team sought to answer two basic questions: what should UNAMI be focused on and how can it better achieve effective results.

The assessment team concluded that, broadly speaking, UNAMI was working on the right priority issues, based on its mandate, although the report contains some recommendations on updating the Mission's priorities and making them more focused.

The most important conclusions of the assessment team are those regarding how UNAMI seeks to implement its mandate. The report recommends significant changes to Mission strategy-setting, structure, staffing, resources and performance

measurement so that the Mission will be in a stronger position to produce more tangible progress in its priority areas of work.

In order for UNAMI, and indeed any other United Nations peace operation, to achieve tangible results and impact, it needs to have clearly defined objectives, and a strategy to achieve those objectives, with assigned roles and responsibilities, milestones, timelines and a performance measurement framework to measure progress and enable strategy or operational adjustment where warranted. Absent a strategy designed to achieve specific results and a deliberate effort to measure and report on progress against targets, there is a high likelihood that the Mission will engage in extensive activities within its mandated areas without achieving the results over time that the Security Council expects and that the people and the Government need.

Surprisingly, United Nations peace operations, including UNAMI, tend not to put in place the kind of robust strategy-setting and performance measurement framework necessary for the Mission to achieve results over time. The present report makes important recommendations on how UNAMI should significantly enhance its strategy-setting and performance measurement capabilities.

The second major area of recommendations are on Mission structure. The report concludes that UNAMI, again like many other peace operations, has a structure that promotes operational ineffectiveness and tension and underutilizes an important capability in the form of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Electoral Assistance.

Within the structure of UNAMI, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General takes personal responsibility for the political work of the Mission, which is at the heart of the mandate, and of the responsibilities entrusted to him or her by the Secretary-General. While quite understandable, and common throughout United Nations peace operations, as a practical matter this leaves the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Electoral Assistance with a limited role and limited responsibilities. At the same time, there is no one in the Mission below the level of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General charged with and empowered to manage the day-to-day operations of the Mission, leaving a large, complex and expensive operation without the level of daily managerial oversight it requires for effective functioning. The report recommends that the Deputy Special Representative position be reprofiled to include more of the managerial and operational responsibilities of the Mission.

The report makes additional recommendations on the structure of the Mission, including the creation from within existing resources of integrated teams designed and mandated to achieve specific objectives related to the Mission's priority areas of work, the transfer of the Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs from the Mission to the Humanitarian Coordinator's Office and the phasing out of the Kuwait Joint Support Office.

The third major area of recommendations concerns Mission resources and staffing. The report recommends increasing the Mission's capacity to deliver mandate-related results by adding political, human rights and analytical capabilities, especially outside Baghdad. Only 20 per cent, approximately, of the UNAMI budget is allocated for staff directly involved in mandate implementation. A relatively small increase in that areas could have a disproportionate impact on mandate implementation, while being more than offset by savings from other proposed

changes. In addition, the report recommends a security assessment to examine, inter alia, replacing the United Nations Guard Unit in Baghdad.

The last major area of recommendations concerns the collaboration between UNAMI and the United Nations country team. While the Mission and the country team have put in place a number of mechanisms designed to align and coordinate their activities, regrettably the vast majority of those mechanisms are not functioning properly and in many cases exist on paper only. This leads to disjointed activity and frustration among Iraqi counterparts and United Nations staff alike. The most important first step would be the establishment of a senior policy forum chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, which would bring together the leadership of the Mission and the country team for the purpose of promoting the kind of holistic and integrated work and impact of the United Nations system called for by the Secretary-General as part of his reform agenda. The report recommends improving the coordination structure, as well as other measures to promote concerted action. However, in the end it is up to the responsible United Nations officials to act in a manner that prioritizes the needs of Iraq and the interests of the broader United Nations.

Iraq is in a tenuous and precarious situation. Its Government has worked to put the country on a path to a stable, prosperous and democratic future, at peace with its neighbours, and it has achieved some success in advancing down that path, notwithstanding the obstacles in its way. But there should be no illusions about the difficulties that lie ahead and the risk of not only setbacks, but of total failure, causing untold suffering for the people of Iraq. The United Nations has played an important role in Iraq and is capable of playing a vital and indispensable role in assisting Iraq on the path towards a brighter future. Whether it plays this role is no more inevitable than whether Iraq will succeed. The recommendations contained in the report are designed to enhance the United Nations ability to deliver results and ultimately to assist the United Nations in its efforts to support the work of the Iraqi Government and improve the lives of the Iraqi people.

Observations

Iraq is at a perilous time in its history, beset by a wide range of complex and dangerous challenges. The Government of Iraq, with assistance from its partners, has made some important progress in becoming a democratic, stable, prosperous and sovereign country at peace with its neighbours. However, Iraq remains a deeply fractured nation, where important segments of Iraqi society do not feel they have a voice in their Government, where some minority groups who have lived in Iraq for centuries question whether their community will still exist in Iraq in 25 years. There is no guarantee of progress towards stability in Iraq. The needs of Iraq are great and the stakes for the Iraqi people could not be higher. A peaceful, prosperous Iraq is also crucial to the stability of the region. The world's interest in the future of Iraq is clear.

The work over the years of the United Nations in Iraq, especially since 2003, is greatly appreciated by the Iraqi people and its Government. It was heartening to hear one Iraqi after another express appreciation for Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Secretary-General's Special Representative killed in the Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad on 19 August 2003. Coupled with this appreciation though, there is an expectation and need of the Iraqi people and Government for the United Nations to do more, especially now at this fragile time. Iraqis are well aware of the challenges

they face, the dangers, the risks and the implication of social cleavages and renewed conflict.

The Iraqi people trust the United Nations and believe it has the interests of the Iraqi people at heart. Because of this trust, and the legitimacy it bestows on the United Nations, the Organization is capable of playing an indispensable and unique role in Iraq that no other actor can come close to fulfilling. This gives the United Nations a great opportunity to advance the principles and purposes for which it was created. Inherent in that opportunity, however, is a responsibility to do a good job, to deliver results for the Iraqi people.

Many of the challenges faced by UNAMI in Iraq have at their roots policies, practices, rules and procedures originating in New York. The consequences of the inability of the Organization's human resources system to serve the needs of its field missions and its mandated responsibilities are acutely visible in UNAMI. While UNAMI can and should make some changes to how it operates, the implementation of the Secretary-General's reform agenda will be crucial to the Organization's ultimate ability to deliver results in Iraq.

The recommendations in the report are designed primarily to enhance the ability of UNAMI to deliver concrete results. It is essential for any United Nations peace operation to have explicit goals, a strategy to achieve them and the ability to measure their progress. Strategy-setting and performance management should be a routine aspect of a mission's work and should be developed as part of the culture of United Nations peace operations. To be successful, a mission also needs a structure designed for mandate delivery in complex operating environments, and not merely reflecting bureaucratic priorities.

Some of the recommendations will require a modest investment, others will produce significant savings. Given the dramatic changes in Iraq over the course of the past few years, a reallocation of resources of this nature is warranted and, in some cases, overdue.

The Security Council, and Member States in general, have made clear their expectation that United Nations peace operations be more nimble, responsive to changing circumstances, results-oriented and tailored to the circumstances of a particular country. The recommendations in this report are designed with those shared objectives in mind, with the intention of helping UNAMI move in that direction. To accomplish those objectives, change is required. The advocates for change will need to prevail over those who wish to preserve the status quo and will need to overcome the myriad of arguments and criticisms mustered in its defence.

The assessment team would like to pay tribute to the staff of the United Nations in Iraq who, despite the obstacles, perform their vital work every day with dedication and commitment. We would especially like to recognize the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Jan Kubiš, who, in our view exemplifies the model attributes of a leader, manager and member of the international civil service.

We wish to offer a very special thanks to the Boston Consulting Group, and in particular Ross Love, Simonida Subotic, Raghav Verma and Christopher Williams, who on a pro bono basis provided extensive and invaluable assistance in the preparation of the report, and in particular the underlying data analysis and supplementary material used to support the report's findings.

Finally, we wish to express our respect for and admiration of the people of Iraq who have faced so many difficulties and endured so much suffering, but whose

dignity, pride and optimism remain as inspirational as ever. They deserve a brighter future, and it is our hope and belief that the United Nations will walk towards that future side-by-side with them.

List of recommendations

Strategic priorities and strategy-setting

1. Adopt the following strategic priorities:

(a) Prevention of conflict;

(b) National reconciliation, including the resolution of Baghdad-Erbil relations;

(c) Promotion and protection of human rights, including women's empowerment and gender equality;

(d) Promotion and protection of minorities' place in society;

(e) Promotion of good governance, including free and fair elections and implementation of the constitution;

(f) Support for Iraqi sovereignty and regional reintegration, including resolution of the Kuwait file.

2. Create a distinct strategy-setting process resulting in strategy documents for the overall mandate of UNAMI, as well as for each Mission-strategic priority, with clear goals and a plan to achieve them, including benchmarks, timelines and assigned roles and responsibilities.

3. Establish quarterly or semi-annual periods for strategy review and revise strategy and/or implementation plans, as appropriate.

4. Embed a performance measurement framework and monitoring plan into the strategy-setting process and resulting strategy documents.

5. Produce an annual report to the Security Council on Mission performance relating to the strategy and the progress made against benchmarks and indicators for each specified priority, including reasons for lack of progress, in advance of the annual mandate review.

6. Ensure that the strategy serves as the basis for budget requests so that resources are tightly linked to the strategic goals and the results specified in the performance measurement framework.

7. Establish a UNAMI strategic planning unit from within existing resources, reporting to the reprofiled Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs (see below) and supported by a policy and priorities committee.

8. Establish a policies and priorities committee within UNAMI, chaired by the reprofiled Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs, which would include the heads of all sections in UNAMI, to prepare strategy and planning documents for approval by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Organizational structure

9. Reprofile the position of Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs to a role focused on overseeing and managing the day-to-day work of the Mission,

freeing up the Special Representative to focus on political matters and mandate implementation.

10. Reprofile the Chief of Staff role to align with the new Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs role and reallocate staff within the offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Chief of Staff accordingly.

11. Integrate the Women's Protection Unit and the Child Protection Unit into the Human Rights Office.

12. Establish integrated, cross-functional, multi-disciplinary teams using UNAMI staff and, where appropriate, staff from the country team and outside experts aligned to specific objectives derived from mission priorities, with the aim of delivering on those objectives within a given time frame.

13. Progressively transfer functions and staff of the Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs from the Mission to the Humanitarian Coordinator's Office; amend the proposed 2018 UNAMI budget so that funding for the Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs is progressively reduced and ends entirely by 30 June 2018.

14. Close the transport workshop and the warehouse in Kuwait.

The Department of Field Support should:

15. Work with the Department of Management, UNAMI and other Missions receiving services from the Kuwait Joint Support Office, as well as relevant oversight bodies, to phase out the back-office functions of the Kuwait Joint Support Office, in the context of the global service delivery model and the management reforms of the Secretary-General.

Resources and staffing

16. Strengthen and expand the leadership, representational and political capabilities of UNAMI beyond Baghdad by:

(a) Raising the level of the Head of Office in Erbil;

(b) Creating a Head of Office in Mosul, supported by two Political Affairs Officers (National Professional Officer);

(c) Creating a Head of Office in Sulaymaniyah, supported by one Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer);

(d) Creating a Head of Office (National Professional Officer) in Najaf.

17. Strengthen and expand the human rights capabilities of UNAMI by:

(a) Creating four Human Rights Officer positions (two international and two National Professional Officer) in Baghdad to focus on legal reform, rule of law, prisons and detention;

(b) Creating two Human Rights Officer positions (one international and one National Professional Officer) in Erbil to focus on legal reform, rule of law, prisons and detention;

(c) Creating two Human Rights Officer positions (one international and one National Professional Officer) in Mosul.

18. Strengthen the capacity of UNAMI to obtain the necessary expertise in support of targeted, mandate-specific activities, at the time the expertise is required, by adding an additional $300,000 to the 2018 UNAMI general consultancy budget, under the discretion of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

19. Strengthen and expand the analytical capabilities of UNAMI by:

(a) Adding $150,000 to the 2018 Joint Analysis Unit consultancy budget to fund a range of international and national consultants to work on, inter alia, constitutional and legal analysis on disputed boundaries, minority issues, armed groups, terrorism financing and counter-terrorism, macroeconomic issues and the energy sector;

(b) Creating one Analyst (National Professional Officer) position in Basra reporting to the Joint Analysis Unit to cover the south of Iraq.

20. Increase reliance on national staff at all levels and begin to incorporate United Nations Volunteers into the Mission's human resources strategy, and in particular:

(a) Increase the percentage of national staff in Mission support, including by hiring of National Professional Officers, from approximately 70 per cent to approximately 80 per cent;

(b) Develop a forward-looking human resources strategy that methodically goes through every international post in the Mission to identify which posts could be transitioned to national staff or United Nations Volunteers, when that could happen, and what preparatory work would be required to enable such a transition.

21. Ensure appropriate representation of Kurdish-speaking national staff, including National Professional Officers, in Erbil, as well as in Baghdad and Kirkuk.

The Department of Field Support should:

22. Request that the International Civil Service Commission review the rest and recuperation cycle for all duty stations in Iraq, with a view to changing the cycle in Baghdad from four to six weeks.

23. Instruct the Mission to implement the outstanding recommendations from the 2014 civilian staffing review, and obtain approval from Headquarters not to implement any recommendations the Mission believes should not be implemented.

24. Send a team to UNAMI to work with the Mission to assess what additional Mission support functions and staff could be moved from Baghdad to Kuwait or Erbil.

The Department of Safety and Security should:

25. Send a security assessment team to Iraq to redesign the security architecture based on current threat levels; particular attention should be paid to the possibility of replacing the United Nations Guard Unit in Baghdad with a combination of Iraqi security forces for facility perimeter protection and United Nations personnel for facility entry-point control; consideration should also be given to terminating the administrative presence of the United Nations Guard Unit in Erbil.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and United Nations country team collaboration and coordination

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the United Nations country team should:

26. Establish a senior policy forum, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and made up of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, heads of country team agencies and heads of UNAMI sections, with defined terms of reference, to provide strategic direction to the work of the United Nations in Iraq and to ensure strategic coordination and coherence between the work of the Mission and the country team. The senior policy forum should meet on a set schedule and disseminate records of its decisions.

27. Establish a Joint Coordination Office using staff from the coordination unit of the UNAMI Integrated Coordination Office for Development and Humanitarian Affairs and the Resident Coordinator's Office to support effective coordination of United Nations activities in Iraq and to serve as a secretariat for the senior policy forum; the Joint Coordination Office should report on a six-month rotating basis to the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

28. Develop workplans, with clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, specific objectives and timelines, for each of the agreed areas of shared work between UNAMI and the country team.

29. Establish a coordination mechanism for each of the agreed areas of shared work, with terms of reference, and keep a record of decisions from meetings of the coordination mechanisms.

30. Report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, in writing, on a quarterly basis on the progress achieved in implementing the workplans.

31. Produce a weekly report of key United Nations activities and developments in Iraq for the Mission and the United Nations country team leadership and respective headquarters.

32. Submit to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General any project document that is going to be jointly signed by a United Nations entity and the Government of Iraq one week in advance of planned signature for his information and comment as appropriate.

33. Have annual "360-degree" evaluations of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and all UNAMI section heads and country team agency heads, including a component on how well they collaborate with their peers, with results made available to supervisors.

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and United Nations country team common services and cost-sharing

UNAMI should:

34. Provide clear, explicit justification for the costs it charges for the full range of services it provides to members of the country team.

35. Report annually to the country team by 28 February on expenditures against targets for the previous fiscal year on services for which country team members pay an annual fee.

36. Engage transparently with the country team in forward-looking planning processes so that members of the country team know what services UNAMI will be in a position to provide and at what cost, and are able to budget accordingly.

37. Retain oversight, accountability and responsibility for the UNAMI headquarters compound in Baghdad and associated assets and facilities.

The Department of Field Support should:

38. Work with the Controller, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Group to develop a set of exceptional principles and explicit, formal guidance on cost reimbursement in situations where agencies are wholly or almost wholly dependent on missions for their operations (i.e. Baghdad, Mogadishu, Tripoli).

Performance measurement and reporting

UNAMI should:

39. Adopt a new performance measurement framework that tracks progress in mandate implementation using the objectives and benchmarks from the strategic plans.

40. Adopt an operational performance measurement framework to assess effectiveness and efficiency, based on the Department of Field Support model used for peacekeeping missions.

41. Conduct annual stakeholder reviews and public polling in Iraq to assist in measuring performance.

42. Incorporate performance measurement reporting in the annual report to the Security Council.

Enclosure 1*

Breakdown of UNAMI 2017 budget; mandate activity staff costs 20% of total



1. Mandate Activity Staff Costs for units represented as individual assigned staff adjusted to 2-year budgeted costs, which are included unadjusted as Non-Mandate Activity staff costs. 2. UNSOS budget is considered Non-Staff costs as posts are not on UNAMI payroll. If reclassified under Security Staff Costs they would represent ~25% of budget (~$30M), and Non-Mandate Activity Staff Costs would represent ~50% of budget (~$60M).
Note: Staff Costs include salaries, common staff costs, and danger pay allowance.
Source: UNAMI Mandate and Budget

* The enclosure is being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

Enclosure 2*

Breakdown of UNAMI 2017 budget; support and security staff costs 50% of total



1. Mandate Activity Staff Costs for units represented as substantive support staff aligned to these substantive units, who are indirectly identified under Support Staff Costs 3. (2017 budget is mentioned here this is costs on purchase but not annual payout. If mentioned under Security Staff Costs, it is Staff Costs would represent ~25% of budget (~$30M), and Security Staff Costs would represent ~25% (~$30M)
Source: UNAMI Mandate and Budget

* The enclosure is being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

Enclosure 3*

potential efficiency savings through 5 initiatives

	Savings Opportunity	Impact Levers	Key Assumptions
1	Migrate shared service functions from KUSO to a shared service center	• Savings on lower costs per employee in a shared service center relative to Kuwait • Efficiency uplift (lower headcount)	• ~30% efficiency uplift for consol KUSO operations[1]
2	Gradually phase out UNSO operations in Baghdad	• Troop costs and travel costs • Troop benefits (rec. leave, etc.) • Rations (food, water, etc.) • Fixed costs associated with accommodation	• Baghdad operations does not influence Kuwait operations
3	Gradually increase proportion of national support staff from 79% to 85% of total support staff	• Savings on international employee cost differential • Savings on R&R productivity loss	• No efficiency loss in replacing international (same headcount)
4	Modify R&R benefits in Baghdad from 4 weeks to 3/week accrual policy	• Lump sum reimbursement for travel • Productivity associated with time taken off	• Historical utilization rate of R&R to remain constant
5	Transfer IOCDHA from UNAM to HCDOHA[2]	• Staff cost savings	• Does not imply staffing changes across organizations

* The enclosure is being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

United Nations A/72/598–S/2017/967

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 November 2017
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 109
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 16 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the communiqué of the sixteenth Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law-Enforcement Organizations that took place on 4–5 October 2017 in Krasnodar (Annex I), and the statement by the participants of that meeting (Annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 109, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex I to the letter dated 16 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Communiqué of the sixteenth Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law-Enforcement Organizations

Participants at the sixteenth Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law-Enforcement Organizations, held on 4–5 October 2017, from 75 countries and 4 international organizations — the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Union,

Guided by the fundamental norms and principles of international law, including the principles of the equality and sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs,

Emphasizing the responsibility of States Members of the United Nations in countering terrorism,

Reaffirming the course set by the Meeting towards establishing a united counter-terrorist front of special services and law-enforcement organizations, with the United Nations playing a central coordinating role, and implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Taking into account:

The risk of the emergence of new hotbeds of armed conflict and further expansion of the geography of terrorism;

The unprecedented increase in terrorist activity worldwide;

The threats from foreign terrorist fighters returning from armed conflict zones to their own countries to carry out terrorist activity;

The independent jihadist tactics actively employed by terrorist groups;

The ongoing radicalization of the population and the uncontrolled dissemination of terrorist narratives, including online through the activities of bloggers and on social media;

The use by terrorists of advanced means of communication enabling the cryptographic protection of transmitted data;

The increasing number and technological complexity of computer attacks on the information infrastructures of States;

Threats of a terrorist nature to the holding of major international events;

Determining as priorities:

The creation of a universal counter-terrorist information environment, including by using the resources of the International Counterterrorism Database;

A widespread counter-propaganda campaign against terrorist and extremist narratives;

The strengthening of interaction to prevent information and communications technologies being used for terrorist and other criminal purposes;

The enhancement of practical cooperation among national actors in responding to computer incidents,

Decide to:

1. Issue a joint statement in support of United Nations Security Council resolution 2354 (2017) and the comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives;

2. Enhance cooperation among partners to block channels of terrorist propaganda, including online;

3. Increase the sharing of intelligence concerning identified members, new modus operandi and tactics employed by international terrorist organizations, foreign terrorist fighters and their routes of travel;

4. Take measures to improve cooperation between special services and law-enforcement organizations, including through the United Nations, in order to prevent information and communications technologies being used in terrorist and other unlawful activities;

5. Help promote the norms, rules and principles concerning the responsible behaviour of States in the information space in all international forums, first and foremost the United Nations;

6. Use the Working Group of Security Intelligence and Law-Enforcement Experts on Major International Events Security, which operates within the framework of the Meeting, as a platform for interaction and the sharing of intelligence on possible security threats prior to and during the 2018 FIFA World Cup;

7. Convene the seventeenth Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law-Enforcement Organizations in 2018, in the territory of the Russian Federation, and to begin preparing the agenda for that event.

Annex II to the letter dated 16 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the participants at the sixteenth Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law-Enforcement Organizations

(Krasnodar, 4–5 October 2017)

We, the participants at the sixteenth Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law-Enforcement Organizations,

Calling for the establishment of a united, global, counter-terrorist front, with the United Nations playing a central coordinating role, based on the fundamental principles of international law that reaffirm the equality and sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs, and also the leading role and primary responsibility of States in countering terrorism,

Emphasizing the need to coordinate national approaches in order to counter the spread of terrorist ideology and propaganda, which has become one of the principal mechanisms for radicalization and for recruiting terrorists,

Expressing concern about the use of information and communications technologies by terrorists for the organization and promotion of terrorist activities and the direct implementation of acts of terrorism,

Taking into account that international terrorist organizations make extensive use of the information space, including the Internet, blogger-centered milieux and social media to disseminate their ideology and propaganda and encourage involvement in terrorist activity,

1. *Express comprehensive support* for United Nations Security Council resolution 2354 (2017) and the comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives" (hereinafter — "the framework"),

2. *Call for* the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1624 (2005) and 2354 (2017) and for the use of the measures and practical steps recommended in the framework to effectively counter the dissemination of terrorist narratives,

3. *Recognize the need* to formulate and take joint decisions to prevent international terrorist organizations from using the benefits of information and communications technologies for the purposes of disseminating their ideology and propaganda, communication, coordination and organization of terrorist attacks and other unlawful acts,

4. *Note* the importance of developing more advanced methods of monitoring and removing terrorist material disseminated through the Internet and social media, in order to counter and prevent terrorism, incitement of terrorist acts as well as direct or indirect public advocacy of terrorism,

5. *Express our* strong commitment to counter-terrorism objectives and *undertake to work together in order to improve* the efficiency of the collective efforts of the international community of special services, security agencies and law-enforcement organizations.

United Nations S/2017/968

Security Council

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16 November 2017

Original: English

Plurinational State of Bolivia: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2319 (2016), 2314 (2016), 2253 (2015), 2235 (2015), 2209 (2015), 2178 (2014), 2118 (2013), 1989 (2011), 1540 (2004) and 1267 (1999),

Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law and *reiterating* that those individuals, entities, groups or governments responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,

Condemning in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and *expressing* grave concern that civilians continue to be killed and injured by chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,

Expressing further alarm that chemical weapons have been used in Syria by non-State actors and that the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIL or Da'esh), the Al Nusrah Front and other non-State actors used or have shown obvious intent to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use chemical weapons,

Reaffirming that no party in the Syrian Arab Republic should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons,

Noting that additional allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria are being investigated by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and *stressing* the imperative for the FFM not to do so in a remote mode, which does not allow to ensure the necessary quality of the investigation,

Stressing the importance, as part of any investigation, of considering all possible leads and scenarios without exception, respecting the chains of custody to preserve the integrity of material evidence as well as conducting timely on-site visits, including collecting and analysing samples as appropriate, whenever security conditions allow,

Recalling that the FFM is not mandated to reach conclusions about attributing responsibility for chemical weapons use,

Reiterating that the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) should work in an independent, impartial and professional manner in implementing its mandate,

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Recalling that the United Nations Secretary-General in his letter to the President of the Security Council on 27 August 2015 committed to undertake the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff of the JIM to provide the relevant requisite skill sets on the basis of professional expertise and experience, with due regard to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide geographical basis as possible, which fully applies to the FFM, as provided in its Terms of Reference and the CWC,

Recalling paragraph 7 of resolution 2319 (2016), including with respect to the ability of the JIM to examine additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the JIM,

Recalling further the Decision of the OPCW Executive Council EC-86/Dec.9 dated 13 October 2017, which encouraged States Parties to share, according to their national laws and as appropriate, information related to cases of developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring, or using chemical weapons by non-State actors, as well as domestic investigations conducted with regard to chemical weapons, including information on any subsequent criminal or other legal proceedings undertaken,

Recalling that resolution 2319 (2016) encouraged the JIM, where relevant, to consult appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange information on non-State actors' perpetration, organization, sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic where the FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemical weapons,

Welcoming full and profound cooperation extended by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to the FFM and JIM in establishing facts related to the incidents with chemical weapons in Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun,

Noting that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic called upon the FFM and JIM to conduct the investigation at the scene in Khan Shaykhun and granted access to its Shayrat airbase, thus enabling the JIM and the OPCW experts to verify its premises by taking environmental samples for the presence of traces of sarin as it was allegedly delivered from there and used in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, interviewing in this regard the airbase staff, examining logbooks and aircraft stationed there,

Expressing its regret that the FFM and JIM failed to visit Khan Shaykhun and to collect environmental samples at Shayrat airbase although the necessary security and technical conditions, as the Council learnt, were in place,

Expressing also its regret that the samples the FFM relied on in the course of investigation lacked full chain of custody envisaged in the Working Instruction of the OPCW Technical Secretariat "Chain of Custody and Documentation for OPCW Samples On-Site",

Having considered the Seventh and the previous reports of the JIM,

Proceeding from the understanding that in view of the experience gained, there is the need for further improvements and update of the JIM's mandate as it was envisaged in paragraph 1 of resolution 2319,

1. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the JIM, as set out in resolution 2235, extended and expanded in resolution 2319 and in this resolution, for a period of one year with a possibility of further extension and update by the Security Council if it deems necessary;

2. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 1–4, 6–9, 12 of resolution 2235 as amended, where appropriate, by this resolution;

3. *Reaffirms* paragraphs 4–7 of resolution 2319 (2016);

4. *Calls on* the JIM and the FFM to engage into the closest cooperation on all the identified cases of the chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic in order for the investigation to be as full and comprehensive as possible, with due regard to all relevant procedures and methods;

5. *Reaffirms* that the JIM, when deemed appropriate, may request that the OPCW provide technical support to the JIM to conduct timely on-site visits to locations allegedly being exposed to the use of chemical weapons, and *invites* the OPCW Director-General to make resources available to the JIM, as appropriate, to enable such a visit;

6. *Urges* all parties in Syria and Member States with relevant capabilities to facilitate without any further delay free and safe access for the JIM to the sites relevant to the mandates of the FFM and the JIM;

7. *Calls upon* the OPCW Director-General to timely inform the UN Security Council through the UN Secretary-General of any difficulties encountered in organizing an on-site visit within the process of investigating a chemical incident, in order to make the UN Security Council aware of the problem;

8. *Recalls* in this regard that in its resolution 2118, it decided that the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties in Syria shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations and *stresses* that this includes an obligation to cooperate with the OPCW Director-General and its FFM and the United Nations Secretary-General and the JIM, that such cooperation includes full access to all locations, individuals, and materials in the Syrian Arab Republic that the JIM deems relevant to its investigation and where it determines there are reasonable grounds to believe access is justified base on its assessment of the facts and circumstances known to it at the time, including in areas within the Syrian territory but outside of the control of the Syrian Arab Republic, and that such cooperation also includes the ability of the JIM to examine additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM but that is related to the mandate of the JIM as set forth in paragraph 5 of resolution 2235;

9. *Calls upon* all other states to cooperate fully with the JIM and in particular to provide it with any relevant information they may possess pertaining to individuals, entities, groups or governments who were perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or otherwise involved in use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;

10. *Invites* the UN Secretary-General to ensure recruiting impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise and that due regard to be paid to as wide of a geographical basis as practicable for the JIM in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2235 and the Terms of Reference, as outlined in document S/2015/697, and *encourages* the OPCW Director-General to take fully into account paragraph 8 of the Terms of Reference of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria in what regards its composition;

11. *Requests* the JIM to dispatch as soon as possible an investigative team to the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun to conduct full-scale investigation using the whole spectrum of relevant methods;

12. *Urges* all parties in Syria and Member States with relevant capabilities to facilitate without any further delay free and safe access for JIM's experts to the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and adjacent areas;

13. *Requests* the JIM to dispatch immediately another investigative team to Shayrat airbase in the Syrian Arab Republic to collect environmental samples in order to verify the allegations that sarin used in Khan Shaykhun had been stored at the airbase;

14. *Requests* the JIM in the light of paragraph 8 of its Seventh Report to re-evaluate its earlier assessments and conclusions regarding incident with chemical weapons use in the town of Sarmin since the JIM itself described as "improbable" the eventuality in which a chlorine-filled barrel bomb, dropped from a helicopter, could have impacted through the ventilation shaft with a matching dimension;

15. *Decides* that the JIM in conducting its investigations must be guided by high standards established by the CWC and, accordingly, use the whole spectrum of relevant methods envisaged in the above-mentioned Convention and in particular Part XI of its Annex on Implementation and Verification, which includes investigation, sampling, interviewing witnesses and collection of evidence and information on the site of an incident;

16. *Requests* the JIM in addition to provisions of paragraph 15 above to make use of the recommendations contained in its Fourth and Fifth reports (para. 49 and para. 11 respectively) in order to ensure full-scale, professional and high quality investigations;

17. *Directs* the JIM in the course of its investigations to make full use of evidence collected by the FFM in accordance with the CWC high standards, as referred to in paragraph 16 above;

18. *Requests* the JIM to retain its findings and the findings of the FFM, not based on the results of on-site investigation, as well as remotely collected evidence and information until such time, when full-scale and high quality investigation on the site of an incident becomes possible;

19. *Decides* that any JIM's investigation shall indispensably involve collection and analysis of additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the JIM, including all information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic as well as others pertaining to activities of non-State actors with regard to using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring chemical weapons;

20. *Reiterates* its support expressed in paragraph 5 of resolution 2209 for the OPCW Executive Council decision of 4 February 2015 to entrust the OPCW FFM with the task "to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria" and *underlines* that paragraph 5 or other provisions of its resolution 2235 do not affect this tasking and do not limit it to determination that a specific incident in Syria involved or likely involved the use of chemical weapons only;

21. *Encourages* the JIM to consult and cooperate with appropriate United Nations counterterrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange information on non-State actors' perpetration, organization, sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;

22. *Requests* the UN Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, to submit to the Security Council, for its authorization, within 20 days of the adoption of this Resolution, recommendations on possible additional measures, if necessary, on strengthening

the JIM in the light of this resolution, and *expresses* its intent to respond to the recommendations within five days of their receipt;

23. *Requests* the JIM to collect and analyse information on trends in the activities of non-State actors involving preparations for use and actual use of chemical weapons and submit to the Council relevant analytical reports every three months;

24. *Requests* the JIM to submit to the Council and the OPCW Executive Council by 1 May 2018 and 1 November 2018 the reports on the results of its investigations conducted in full accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 above;

25. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2017/969*

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 November 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2347 (2017)

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2347 (2017), the Security Council reaffirmed that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and noted with grave concern the involvement of non-State actors, notably terrorist groups, in the destruction of cultural heritage and the trafficking in cultural property and related offences. The Council encouraged Member States to take preventive measures to safeguard cultural property in the context of armed conflict and to provide assistance in demining cultural sites. In paragraph 8 of that resolution, the Council requested Member States to take appropriate steps to prevent and counter the illicit trade and trafficking in cultural property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and religious importance originating from armed conflict areas, notably from terrorist groups, including by prohibiting the cross-border trade in such illicit items, particularly when there was reasonable suspicion that such items had been illegally removed from Iraq since 6 August 1990 and from Syria since 15 March 2011. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 2347 (2017), by which the Council requested me to report on the implementation of that resolution.

2. The report was prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The information and observations herein are based on submissions by 29[1] Member States and other international governmental and non-governmental bodies, such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) and the International Council of Museums (ICOM).

* Reissued for technical reasons on 28 November 2017.

[1] Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Myanmar, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Uruguay and Ukraine.

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3. Given the relatively short time since the adoption of resolution 2347 (2017), it is difficult to evaluate its impact on the ability of Member States to counter threats. More time is needed for Member States and art market actors to adjust their legislation and business procedures, respectively. Therefore, the present report takes stock of the existing situation, including prior to the adoption of the resolution, and provides a baseline against which future developments can be assessed in subsequent reports, should the Security Council request them.

II. Recent developments

4. Out of the 82 UNESCO World Heritage properties in the Arab States region, 17 are inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger owing to armed conflict. In Iraq, the World Heritage Sites of Hatra and Ashur have sustained damage. Nimrud and the Ancient City of Nineveh, both on the country's Tentative List, have also been severely affected. In addition, over 100 other Iraqi cultural heritage sites have been damaged or destroyed. All six World Heritage Sites in the Syrian Arab Republic have been severely affected by armed conflict, notably the Crac des Chevaliers and the Ancient Cities of Aleppo and Damascus. Key components of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra have been intentionally destroyed and, on 18 August 2015, its former Director of Antiquities, Khalid al-Asaad, was killed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh).[2] Eight sites on the country's Tentative List, as well as many other heritage sites, have been damaged, destroyed or severely affected, notably by looting and illegal excavations. In Yemen, the World Heritage Sites of the Old City of Sana'a and the Historic Town of Zabid, in addition to the Old City of Sa'adah and the Marib Dam, both on the country's Tentative List, have been repeatedly damaged. The cultural heritage sites of Libya have also been affected by damage, looting and destruction, including at least eight religious sites in the Old Town of Tripoli and its surroundings throughout 2014 and 2015, as well as the World Heritage Site of Sabratha in 2017.

5. While reliable estimates of the overall value of antiquities smuggling are not available, information provided by Member States from 2015 onwards reveals the development by ISIL of administrative structures designed to manage looting activities and evidence of the "taxing" of looted antiquities. This suggests that ISIL organized the large-scale looting and smuggling of cultural artefacts as an important source of income.

6. Satellite-based monitoring revealed a marked increase in looting in ISIL-held areas in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic in 2014 and 2015. In addition, images taken of Yemen on 29 October 2015 revealed increased looting activities within the Ancient City of Marib,[3] where Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (QDe.129) is active.

7. Although ISIL has continued to lose territory in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, reducing its opportunities for looting (see S/2016/501, para. 11), the Monitoring Team and UNESCO continue to receive reports from Member States and international organizations of seizures of antiquities originating in these countries, as well as the ongoing exploitation of cultural sites under the control of terrorist groups. A recently filed complaint in a national court indicates that ISIL had been professionally marketing excavated antiquities for international sale.[4]

[2] Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

[3] Information provided by the Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

[4] United States Department of Justice, "United States files complaint seeking forfeiture of

III. Implementation of resolution 2347 (2017)

8. In response to the above-mentioned challenges, the international community has launched a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening the protection of cultural heritage in conflict situations and combating the illicit trafficking of cultural property. In addition to resolution 2347 (2017), the Security Council has adopted the following resolutions related to cultural heritage: resolution 2199 (2015), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; and resolutions 2253 (2015) and 2368 (2017), in which the Council recognized the illicit trafficking of artefacts as a source of financing of terrorism and called on Member States to take appropriate measures to prevent the trade in cultural property from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Council has further considered culture and its protection in the context of United Nations peacekeeping and political missions, in its resolutions 2100 (2013) and 2233 (2015), establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali[4] (MINUSMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, respectively.

9. The strategy for the reinforcement of actions by UNESCO for the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism in the event of armed conflict,[5] and the action plan for its implementation,[6] are aimed at integrating culture, and in particular the protection of cultural heritage, in humanitarian, security, peacekeeping and human rights policies and operations, including through operational partnerships, such as the memorandum of understanding signed between UNESCO and the International Committee of the Red Cross in February 2016. Several related resolutions and declarations have been adopted by other United Nations bodies, including the General Assembly[7] and the Human Rights Council.[8] Two reports by the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights have focused on the intentional destruction of cultural heritage.[9]

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antiquities associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)", press release 15 December 2016.

[5] UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference, Thirty-eighth Session, Paris, 3–18 November 2015*, vol. 1, *Resolutions*, resolution 48, and "Reinforcement of UNESCO's action for the protection of culture and the promotion of cultural pluralism in the event of armed conflict", document No. 38 C/49 (2 November 2015). Available from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002351/235186e.pdf.

[6] UNESCO, "Follow-up to decisions and resolutions adopted by the Executive Board and the General Conference at their previous sessions", document 201 EX/5, part I, 24 March 2017. Available from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247706e.pdf.

[7] Resolutions 69/281 of 28 May 2015, on saving the cultural heritage of Iraq, and 69/196 of 18 December 2014, on International Guidelines for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to Trafficking in Cultural Property and Other Related Offences. The latter is the first international instrument specifically developed to address criminal justice-related aspects of combating trafficking in cultural property, and is applicable to all Member States at all times. The Guidelines are aimed at assisting legislators and policymakers, as well as law enforcement officers, prosecutors, magistrates, and public and private institutions in effectively protecting cultural property from being trafficked and in effectively responding to trafficking, with a view to bringing perpetrators to justice and to returning the confiscated property to the legitimate owners.

[8] Human rights Council resolution 33/20 of 30 September 2016.

[9] A/HRC/31/59 of 3 February 2016, on the intentional destruction of cultural heritage as a violation of human rights, and A/71/317 of 9 August 2016, on a human rights approach to the intentional destruction of cultural heritage, in conflict and non-conflict situations, by States and non-State actors.

A. Ratification of international instruments

10. The strength and effectiveness of multilateral legal instruments depend on ratifications by States parties. The status of ratification of international instruments relevant to the implementation of resolution 2347 (2017), as at November 2017, can be found in annex to the present document.

11. To further promote ratification of these instruments, in February 2017 an informal ratification task force for the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects was established at United Nations Headquarters in New York, and will meet annually. A regional initiative to encourage ratification of the UNESCO Culture Conventions[10] in East Africa and the adjacent Indian Ocean islands was also spearheaded by UNESCO, in collaboration with the authorities of Mauritius, in July 2017.

B. Institutional strengthening

12. In July 2016 in Brussels, the 180 members of the WCO Council unanimously adopted a resolution on the role of customs in preventing illicit trafficking of cultural objects,[11] outlining tools and measures necessary to counter this phenomenon.

1. Creation of specialized units in central and local administrations

13. Prior to the adoption of resolution 2347 (2017), in which the Council called for the creation of specialized units in central and local administrations, a number of Member States had already taken similar measures. The Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Italy), created in 1969, was the first specialized law enforcement department dedicated to the protection of cultural heritage. More recent initiatives include the creation by Mexico in October 2015 of a unit for investigating and prosecuting the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and the establishment by Sweden in April 2016 of a unit within the national police focused on crimes related to wildlife and cultural heritage. Estonia reported on the creation of a dedicated e-commerce control unit within its Tax and Customs Board, and Ecuador reported putting in place a specialized investigation unit for crimes against cultural heritage within its Judicial Police in 2010. In 2005, Switzerland created a specialized body within the Federal Office of Culture to deal with the international transfer of cultural property. Romania reported that the Inspectorate General of its national police had specialized personnel for the protection of national cultural heritage.

2. Tools and training for customs and law enforcement dedicated personnel and public prosecutors

14. In 2017, Sweden established a common platform for internal and external communication among relevant authorities, including its National Commission for

[10] Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005); Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003); Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001); Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970); Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954); and Universal Copyright Convention (1952 and 1971).

[11] Available from www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/about-us/legal-instruments/resolutions/resolution_cultural-objects.pdf?la=en.

UNESCO, National Museums of World Culture agency, customs officials and police, on issues related to illicit trafficking of cultural property.

15. Myanmar had trained focal points within national authorities for the protection of cultural heritage, while Armenia and France had trained their customs officials on illicit trafficking.

16. Canadian customs officers and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had received general training on the import and export control aspects of that country's cultural property law, as well as documentation concerning cultural property, with a particular emphasis on objects from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Russian Federation had put in place similar measures regarding objects from Iraq.

17. In its capacity-building programmes, UNESCO[14] works in close cooperation with partners such as INTERPOL, WCO,[15] ICOM,[16] UNIDROIT and UNODC to ensure the complementarity of their activities.

3. Creation or improvement of procedures or databases to collect information on criminal activity related to cultural property and its illicit trade

18. The Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage has developed a database of illegally removed cultural heritage, the largest and most effective of its kind. Colombia and Romania reported the creation of a specialized database containing information on illegally exported cultural property and "stolen cultural goods". Japan, the Russian Federation and Slovakia maintained records of stolen cultural objects. Further information related to international databases is provided in section III.E below.

C. Legal and judicial measures

1. Adoption of legal measures to prohibit cross-border trade of illicitly traded or trafficked cultural property originating in contexts of armed conflict

19. All 28 States members of the European Union prohibit the sale, supply, transfer or export of cultural objects removed from the Syrian Arab Republic since 9 May 2011[17] and exported from Iraq since 6 August 1990.[18] In June 2017, the

[14] UNESCO has undertaken various capacity-building programmes for heritage professionals and police and customs officials, particularly in countries in conflict, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, in response to the heightened risk of trafficking in cultural objects. These programmes build the capacities of participants in the implementation of preventive measures and practical tools, such as updating databases on looted artefacts and improving inventories and restitution processes. Following a training-of-trainers programme in 2013, six instructors from the Afghan National Customs Academy trained 150 customs officers from across the country between 2014 and 2016. Further training sessions were held throughout 2017.

[15] In April 2017, in cooperation with the embassy of France for Libya in Tunis and with the support of Tunisian customs officials, WCO organized the first regional workshop for the Middle East and North Africa region on the topic of "The role of customs in security and development: the function of cultural heritage protection", held in Hammamet, Tunisia, which brought together customs officials from 11 countries.

[16] The International Council of Museums ICOM has developed several tools to fight illicit trafficking, including the Red Lists, which classify the endangered categories of archaeological objects or works of art in the most vulnerable areas of the world, in order to prevent them being sold or illegally exported. To date, 16 Red Lists have been published. Updated Emergency Red Lists of Iraqi cultural objects at risk and of Libyan cultural objects at risk were issued following the adoption of resolution 2199 (2015).

[17] In conformity with Council of the European Union Regulation No. 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 (amended by Regulation 2015/827 of 28 May 2015) concerning restrictive measures in view of

European Commission presented a draft regulation on the illegal import and trafficking of cultural goods from outside the European Union, stressing the importance of a common European Union framework in this regard. The regulation would provide customs officials with a legal means to seize and retain goods in cases of doubtful certification.

2. Adoption of sanctions to ensure that no funds, other financial assets or other economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly, by their nationals or persons within their territory for the benefit of ISIL and individuals, groups, entities or undertakings associated with ISIL or Al-Qaida, in accordance with relevant resolutions

20. Since its inception, the Al-Qaida sanctions regime has implemented a global asset freeze against listed individuals and entities. Consequently, any activity that directly or indirectly generates assets for a listed individual or entity falls under this provision. This includes the looting and smuggling of artefacts. Any individual or entity involved in such a trade that directly or indirectly benefits ISIL or Al-Qaida is liable to be sanctioned under this regime, and Member States are encouraged to propose listings of such individuals and entities.

21. In order to counter the threat posed by the large-scale organized looting of cultural artefacts by ISIL,[17] the Security Council, in its resolution 2199 (2015), included a moratorium on trade in cultural items illegally removed from the Syrian Arab Republic and reiterated a similar moratorium on trade in Iraqi artefacts applied in 2003. Subsequently, the Monitoring Team developed a range of recommendations for countering this threat and strengthening mechanisms of control for the international antiquities market,[18] which are reflected in paragraph 17 of resolution 2347 (2017).

22. Canada reported on its contribution to the Financial Action Task Force, its participation in the "Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS" working group to counter ISIL financing and its efforts to protect its own financial system from abuse. Romania reported that the sanctions adopted by the Security Council since 2008 were directly applicable at the national level.[19] Jordan reported that it had shared the names of individuals involved in terrorism and illegal financing through the antiquities trade with relevant agencies and had enforced the related sanctions. France reported that its sanctions regime had been strengthened in 2017 to include asset freezes.

3. Criminalization of illicit trafficking of cultural property

23. Since the adoption of resolution 2347 (2017), there have been no reports of new legal measures on the criminalization of the illicit trafficking of cultural property. Nevertheless, Italy reported that legislation to that effect was currently being discussed by its Senate, while Mexico reported that it had been reviewing related legislation since 2014.[20] In addition, Ecuador,[21] France,[22] Japan,[23] Jordan,[24]

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the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EC) No 442/2011.

[17] In conformity with Council of the European Union Regulation No. 1210/2003 of 7 July 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic and financial relations with Iraq and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2465/96.

[18] First reported by the Monitoring Team in 2014 in its special report on ISIL (see S/2014/815, paras. 72–78).

[19] See S/2013/730, paras. 6–7, S/2016/210, paras. 8–13, S/2016/733, paras. 24–36, S/2016/629, paras. 83–90, S/2017/35, paras. 67–68, and S/2017/971, paras. 67–69.

[20] Article 3, paragraph 1, in conjunction with article 1, paragraph 1, of Government Emergency Ordinance 202/2008.

[21] Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Areas and Monuments.

[22] Section 5 of the Comprehensive Organic Penal Code, arts. 237–240.

Romania,[27] Saudi Arabia,[28] Serbia,[29] Slovakia,[30] Spain,[31] Turkey,[32] Ukraine[33] and Uruguay[34] reported that such legal measures were already in place.

24. In the framework of international assistance provided through the Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mali reported on elaborating, updating and adopting legislation to incorporate the provisions of chapter 4 of the Second Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict into its national legislation, in order to criminalize theft, pillage or misappropriation of cultural property.

25. At the regional level, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property in May 2017, which is aimed at combating the illicit trafficking of cultural property.

4. Establishment of regulations for the import and export of cultural property, consistent with international standards and the improvement of restitution mechanisms

26. By establishing well-designed import and export regulations, Member States are better positioned to counter the illegal export of cultural objects and to address gaps in the legal framework. In this regard, Ecuador, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Ukraine reported the existence of regulated processes and conditions for the movement of cultural objects.

27. Since 1993, the European Union has regulated the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of member States under Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State, which was updated in 2014 with the support of UNESCO, resulting in new Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 (Recast).

28. UNESCO and the WCO developed guidelines for model export certificates to assist Member States in developing and updating their national customs certification models according to an international standard.

5. Establishment of standards of provenance documentation among relevant business associations and participants in the antiquities market

29. Collectors, art dealers, auction houses and online platforms can serve as the last line of defence against the sale of artefacts looted by terrorist organizations in conflict zones. Nevertheless, they face a significant risk of being involved in this

[27] Law No. 2016-731 of 3 June 2016 on strengthening the fight against organized crime, terrorism and their financing.

[28] Act on Protection of Cultural Properties, art. 193; Act concerning Controls on the Illicit Export and Import of Cultural Property, art. 4; and Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, arts. 52 and 69-7.

[29] Antiquities Law No. 21 of 1988 and Customs Law No. 20 of 1998.

[30] Slovakian Criminal Code, Law No. 286/2009.

[31] Antiquities, Museums and Urban Heritage Law No. 15883.

[32] Turkish Criminal Code, Law Nos. 85/05, 88/05–correction, 107/05–correction, 72/09, 111/09, 121/12, 168/13, 108/14 and 94/16.

[33] Ukrainian Criminal Code, as amended, Act No. 300/2005.

[34] Uruguay Law No. 10/1995.

[35] Turkish Criminal Code.

[36] Criminal Code of Ukraine.

[37] Law No. 18.494 on the Control and Prevention of Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism.

illicit trade. The global trade in art and antiquities uses the concept of "provenance", loosely defined as proof of the legality of prior ownership, as its central compliance instrument. Indeed, there is currently no consensus on the optimal contents of such documentation, however, nor on the handling and storage of documentation related to the sale of antiquities. This situation is exacerbated by the increasing sophistication of forged provenance documents, particularly as regards the trade in ancient coins, for which provenance documents are rarely produced or archived (see S/2016/213, para. 34, and S/2016/629, para. 89). This presents a challenge for sellers and buyers of antiquities, as well as law enforcement agencies.

30. In the light of the growing number of cultural objects of doubtful origin for sale on the Internet, States increasingly recognize the need to take measures to counter this form of illicit trafficking. For example, Argentina reported that it had enhanced the monitoring of online sales, and Estonia and Switzerland reported that they had increased cooperation with online auction platforms.

31. Many countries, such as Canada, have adopted and implemented the UNESCO International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property[53] and the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums.[54]

32. Other means applied by Member States[55] to regulate the art market include overseeing art market professions through general trade regulations, licensing and requirements to maintain registers to track transactions, or applying obligatory provenance-check provisions in accordance with national legislation.

6. Establishment of differentiated due diligence among relevant business associations and participants in the antiquities market

33. The notion of due diligence expressed in the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and the criteria set by article 4 (4) of that Convention have become benchmarks for due diligence evaluations in national legislation and case law, independent of a State's ratification of the Convention. It inspired the requirement of due care and attention included in European Union legislation (Directive 2014/60/EU), as well as in the European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property.

34. While most banks, companies and industries have extensive experience with sophisticated compliance structures and due diligence processes, including know-your-customer procedures, such procedures are generally not well developed in the antiquities market and market participants have only limited experience in the implementation of sanctions (see S/2016/213, paras. 35–36). Furthermore, some market participants have been reluctant to consider the looting and illicit trafficking of antiquities from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic as potentially significant revenue sources for terrorists.[56]

35. An agreed standard of provenance, common rules of compliance, due diligence and know-your-customer procedures would not only enable market participants to better identify potentially problematic antiquities, but also would allow law

[53] UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference, Thirtieth Session, Paris, 26 October–17 November 1999*, vol. 1 and corrigendum, Resolutions. Available from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001213/121320M.pdf.

[54] Available in 41 languages, the Code of Ethics for Museums is a reference tool that sets minimum standards of professional practice for museums and their staff. The Code establishes the obligation to exercise due diligence when acquiring an object. All ICOM members are required to agree to respect this code.

[55] For example, Armenia, Romania, Spain and Turkey.

[56] Based on various consultations between the Monitoring Team and private sector stakeholders between 2014 and 2017.

enforcement investigators to access data on past sales more easily, introducing additional risk factors and obstacles for smugglers and their intermediaries (see S/2016/629, para. 89).

36. Estonia reported on provisions in its national legislation on due diligence, which requires museums to ascertain the origins of cultural property to prevent the registration of cultural property that has entered the country unlawfully.

37. Launched in April 2017, the joint UNESCO-European Union capacity-building project, which is aimed at engaging the European art market in the fight against illicit trafficking, foresees a comprehensive training programme on due diligence issues.

38. ICOM reported on its role in educating museum professionals and art collectors on standards of provenance documentation, differentiated due diligence and measures to prevent the trade of stolen or illegally traded cultural property.

D. Inventorying and documentation

Inventorying and documentation of national cultural property

39. Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine reported on the existence or development of inventories of cultural property. It appears, however, that not all reporting States have established comprehensive national inventories. Rather, in Bulgaria and Canada, for example, inventorying is the responsibility of each individual museum or institution and inclusion in a comprehensive database is voluntary, when such a database exists. In Estonia and Turkey, inventories for national monuments and collections are distinct. France reported on inventorying the archives of French archaeological missions to the Syrian Arab Republic; it has also digitized archives related to the Middle East.

40. Colombia and Ecuador reported on developing software and digitizing physical inventory sheets. Turkey has developed a geographic information system-based inventorying system for built heritage and protected areas. Saudi Arabia reported on the inventorying of archaeological monuments and objects, which is accessible via an online database.

41. In Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, satellite imagery is being used to document damage to cultural sites, including through a collaboration between UNESCO and the Operational Satellite Applications Programme of UNITAR (UNOSAT).[17] Italy is supporting the documentation of the Nineveh Governorate and the area around Mosul in Iraq through satellite imagery and the provision of technical expertise.

42. UNESCO supported a field mission to eastern Mosul, Iraq, in April 2017, to assess the destruction and document new archaeological remains discovered in a tunnel network excavated by ISIL.

[17] A memorandum of understanding was signed between UNESCO and UNOSAT in June 2015, and cooperation is ongoing for the monitoring of destruction and damage via satellite imagery in Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. In this framework, UNOSAT provides images and image analysis to UNESCO, while UNESCO provides the names of experts to conduct the analysis. Following a comprehensive report on damage assessments of Syrian cultural heritage sites published in 2014, a joint summary report on assessments of cultural heritage sites in the framework of UNOSAT cooperation with UNESCO over the course of 2015 was published. Currently, an update of the 2014 report on the Syrian Arab Republic is under preparation in collaboration with UNESCO, with a special segment on the Old City of Aleppo.

43. In Yemen, local authorities and UNESCO have agreed to establish a standard database for the documentation of monuments and sites throughout the country, in partnership with the Oxford University Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa project.

44. In Afghanistan, UNESCO continues to implement the World Bank-funded project on mapping and management planning for archaeological sites, particularly those which are susceptible to threats from mining and infrastructure development.

45. Concerning intangible heritage, a strategic inventorying plan was established in Mali and 249 stakeholders received training in this field. Eritrea inventoried its intangible cultural heritage from June to August 2017, with support from UNESCO.

46. Since March 2014, in the framework of the Emergency Safeguarding of Syrian Cultural Heritage project, funded by UNESCO and the European Union, and other initiatives, technical support for inventorying and documentation has been provided through several activities, including training in the digitization of archives, held between September and November 2016. Emergency recording and archiving of cultural heritage were delivered as part of Project Anqa, a joint initiative of the International Council on Monuments and Sites and CyArk, most notably in January 2017, when the project focused on data collection and analysis.

47. ICOM, together with international organizations such as INTERPOL and UNESCO, national law enforcement personnel and museums, promoted the use of the Object ID standard as a good inventorying practice. The standard is systematically used by a number of Member States for the inventorying of their cultural property, as reported by Italy and referenced in alerts on stolen items received by UNESCO and INTERPOL, as well as national reports on the implementation of the 1970 Convention.[16]

E. International cooperation among judiciary, customs, law enforcement agencies and cultural institutions on investigations, seizures, returns and restitutions

1. Listings of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities involved in the illicit trade in cultural property

48. To date, no listing request has been proposed in the context of resolutions 2253 (2015)[17] and 2347 (2017), despite media reports of ongoing investigations and trials against relevant traffickers and intermediaries by Member States.

2. Development of law enforcement and judicial cooperation in preventing and countering all forms and aspects of trafficking in cultural property that may benefit organized criminal groups, terrorists or terrorist groups

49. Jordan reported on the establishment of administrative cooperation agreements in customs affairs with Arab and other countries, with a view to exchanging information on suspects and violations of customs legislation. France reported on its close cooperation with INTERPOL, notably in the framework of investigations.

50. Colombia reported having signed several bilateral agreements on the fight against illicit trafficking, including with Mexico, Honduras and the United States of

[16] Object ID is an internationally recognized tool initiated by the Getty Research Institute and managed by ICOM. It consists of a standardized checklist available in 17 languages, listing basic information on an object in order to facilitate inventorying.

[17] Paragraph 14.

America. Uruguay reported on the creation of the Technical Committee to Prevent and Combat Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Goods of the Southern Common Market and Union of South American Nations, in April 2017, to facilitate regional cooperation in the fight against illicit trafficking and the recovery of cultural property.

51. As per its usual practice, WCO regularly informed customs directors general of Security Council resolutions, European Union regulations, new restrictions and prohibitions that may have an impact on the work of customs officers on the ground. As at September 2017, 21 Member States had contacted the 27 focal points on the application of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, with the goal of preventing and combating trafficking in cultural property under paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 68/186. These contact points have been included in the ongoing publication of the directory of competent national authorities, integrated into the Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime (SHERLOC) database.[40]

52. Following the successful Operation Pandora of INTERPOL in November 2016, two additional operations organized by Europol (Pandora 2) and WCO (Athena) were to take place in November 2017 to counter illicit trafficking of cultural property, focusing on objects coming from the Middle East. In this framework, three workshops were organized in October 2017, in Albania, Argentina and Romania. In Cyprus in November 2017, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with the support of INTERPOL and UNODC, organized a workshop on trafficking of cultural property and antiquities smuggling, with special attention given to Security Council resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2347 (2017).

3. Requests for and provision of cooperation in investigations, prosecutions, seizure and confiscation, as well as return, restitution or repatriation, of trafficked, illicitly exported or imported, stolen, looted, illicitly excavated or illicitly traded cultural property

53. With regard to its efforts to prevent the import of illicitly trafficked objects, Canada reported on the existing procedures used when diplomatic requests concerning cultural property stolen or looted from cultural institutions were received. The conclusive identification and authentication of such property required cooperation and assistance from government agencies and cultural experts in the country of origin in order to pursue the property's return under Canadian law.

4. Requests for and provision of cooperation in judicial proceedings

54. UNODC has engaged in capacity-building activities aimed at supporting States in enhancing their international cooperation in combating trafficking in cultural property. Training has been provided on criminal justice treaties, notably the Organized Crime Convention, as a basis for international judicial and law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters, especially those involving offences related to trafficking in cultural property, as well as on the International Guidelines for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to Trafficking in Cultural Property and Other Related Offences.

55. In August 2017, a booklet outlining statistics on crimes against cultural property in 58 countries was issued by INTERPOL. This will allow INTERPOL to enhance its operations at the regional level, as well as to share sensitive information about the channels used for the illicit export of stolen objects.

[40] Available from www.unodc.org/cld/v3/sherloc.

56. Greater efforts are being undertaken by international organizations such as UNESCO and INTERPOL to collect data on damage and theft, to facilitate investigations and cooperation with law enforcement authorities, as well as the prosecution of crimes committed against cultural heritage.

5. Enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels within the scope of relevant programmes of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

57. In May 2015, Egypt, under the auspices of UNESCO, hosted an intra-ministerial conference in Cairo on "Cultural property under threat: the cultural, economic and security impacts of antiquities theft in the Middle East", which culminated in the adoption of the Cairo Declaration.[41]

6. Support for and contribution to updating the World Customs Organization Harmonized System Nomenclature and Classification of Goods

58. As part of its work on measures to prevent artefacts looted by ISIL from reaching the international market, in 2016 the Monitoring Team identified administrative changes to the WCO Harmonized System Nomenclature and Classification of Goods as a potentially effective measure (see S/2016/213, para. 28). Chapter 97 of the Nomenclature, which is currently organized by type of antiquities, could be modified to include additional subheadings, including, for example, the age of an item. This would ensure that all members of WCO amend their national regulations in a harmonized manner, preventing regional market distortions (see S/2016/629, paras. 83–84) and allowing national authorities to better identify potentially relevant antiquities and hold those which have been wrongly declared, all of which would provide more time for investigations into their origin and ownership history (see S/2016/213, paras. 29–30).

59. Romania reported using the TARIC customs tariff database, integrated at the European Union level[42] and based on the WCO Harmonized System.

7. Use of and contribution to relevant databases

60. Canada, Estonia, Italy, Romania and Spain reported using the INTERPOL Database on Stolen Works of Art. To date, more than 50,000 stolen objects have been recorded in that database, including 1,099 from the Syrian Arab Republic, 2,786 from Iraq, 684 from Afghanistan, 176 from Libya and 1 from Yemen. Information on some of these artefacts have been disseminated on special posters (see para. 101 below). INTERPOL recognizes that, as a result of the transnational nature of crimes related to culture, the involvement of several national jurisdictions leads to gaps and loopholes which are exploited by individuals and organized groups. The main challenge facing law enforcement is the lack of priority given to this type of crime. Therefore, INTERPOL encourages the creation of specialized units and dedicated national databases to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property.

[41] In response to the threat to cultural heritage in the Middle East, the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan agreed during the conference to unite their efforts against the trafficking, destruction and looting of cultural heritage. The Declaration is available from http://theantiquitiescoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Cairo-Declaration-final-version-May-2015.pdf.

[42] Using TARIC is mandatory for all 28 States members of the European Union, owing to the common customs territory at the European Union level and the resulting requirement that States use the same classification code (regarding the same good) in all European Union customs offices. The legal base of TARIC is Council regulation (EEC) No. 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff.

61. Canada, Estonia and Romania reported on their contribution to and use of the UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws.

62. To date, the ARCHEO platform of WCO contains 145 vetted contacts from 53 countries, international organizations and academia. In order to implement Security Council resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2347 (2017), there have been specific efforts to promote and enhance the use of ARCHEO in the Middle East and North Africa region. In addition, Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania reported on their use of the ARCHEO platform.

63. In Switzerland, the University of Geneva has created the ArThemis database, an open source and publicly available database that records cases of return and restitution of cultural objects that have been resolved without litigation.

8. Provision of data and information on the investigation and prosecution of relevant crimes and related outcomes to the Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime database and on seizures of cultural property to the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

64. UNODC continues to collect national legislation and case law decisions on cultural property offences for inclusion in its SHERLOC database, aimed at facilitating communication between States, police, civil society and other organizations. The database was developed to provide easy access to legislation and cases related to the implementation of the Organized Crime Convention by its States parties. Estonia and Romania reported using SHERLOC.

65. In paragraph 15 of resolution 2253 (2015), the Security Council called upon Member States to report interdictions of antiquities to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. To date, the Monitoring Team continues to receive information concerning seizures of such items by Member States, confirming that several thousand artefacts have been seized within the conflict zone, neighbouring regions and in transit and potential market countries.

66. Member States have highlighted several challenges in this area. Owing to the lack of documentation for existing cultural artefacts within the conflict zones, it is difficult for Member States to confirm that the seized artefacts were looted there. Despite the existence of the global moratorium on the trade of artefacts illegally removed from Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic,[43] Member States must verify that the seized artefacts fall under this moratorium. Member State authorities explained that linking the seized artefacts to the illegal trade by terrorist organizations such as ISIL or Al-Qaida required long-term investigations. The exchange of information in different languages remained a technical challenge and at times slowed down exchanges between Member States.

67. Consequently, the Monitoring Team recommended that Member States actively exchange information on seized antiquities via the INTERPOL Database on Stolen Works of Art (see S/2016/210, para. 10) and information on seizures and investigations via the ARCHEO platform of WCO (see S/2016/629, para. 86). In addition, investigations into seized antiquities are complex and require a significant level of expertise. Therefore, the creation and maintenance of specialized law enforcement and customs authorities by Member States is considered necessary (see S/2016/213, para. 30).

[43] Security Council resolution 2199 (2015), para. 17.

9. Provision of lists of archaeological sites, museums and excavation storage houses located in territories under the control of ISIL or any other listed group to relevant industry stakeholders

68. The documentation of existing artefacts at risk of looting within conflict zones remains a priority. ISIL systematically robbed the storage depots of museums and former archaeological digs. Many artefacts in areas currently under the control of ISIL have been identified and documented. A significant proportion of these items have been catalogued by the museums concerned and archaeological expeditions. Currently, there are several projects under way to enable the collection and digitalization of relevant information (ibid., para. 32).

69. The creation of systematic databases would enable market participants to secure information regarding the identity of objects that have likely been traded by ISIL-related individuals, which would then allow them to vet the antiquities encountered in the course of their business activities (ibid.). Such data can only protect artefacts already unearthed and catalogued, and therefore represents only one of many measures necessary to counter the threat of antiquities looted from conflict zones.

70. As a founding member of the International Committee of the Blue Shield, ICOM participates in different projects aimed at mapping sites and museums located in territories under the control of armed groups. The creation of watch lists of museums and sites in regions at risk has added an essential tool to assess damages and monitor international support.

71. UNESCO, ICOM and their networks have provided information on cultural property in Libya, Mali, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and northern Iraq for inclusion in military "no-strike" lists.

F. Operational actions on the ground

1. Measures to protect and secure cultural property at risk of looting in the context of armed conflict

72. To ensure the protection of the site of Nimrud (Iraq), a protective fence was set up, and tarpaulin material provided to protect archaeological remains. As part of a project for emergency interventions to secure museums and monuments, UNESCO, in collaboration with the Department of Antiquities of Libya, purchased anti-intrusion and security materials for museums and provided support for the construction of secured storage for movable heritage and reinforcement of security perimeters around heritage sites. As a follow-up to several activities implemented by UNESCO in 2016 for the emergency protection of cultural heritage in the Syrian Arab Republic and to the emergency mission to the Ancient City of Aleppo in January 2017, an agreement was concluded with the Aleppo City Council, the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums of the Syrian Arab Republic and non-governmental organizations to take a set of emergency measures. These included consolidation work to prevent buildings from collapsing, debris management to prevent looting and documentation for the Citadel of Aleppo and other major historic structures. A technical coordination meeting was convened by UNESCO at the request of the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums in March 2017 in Beirut.

73. A workshop on emergency safeguarding measures was conducted by the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage for officers from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Antiquities of Iraq in July 2017 in Baghdad. Another training session was held in Erbil in July 2017,

targeting Kurdish police forces, cultural heritage experts and academics. Similar workshops on the conservation and management of archaeological sites at risk were organized by the Iraqi-Italian Institute of Archaeological Sciences in April 2017 in Baghdad.

74. Other training courses were conducted in countries neighbouring conflict-affected areas, including a workshop on the protection of cultural heritage in emergency situations, jointly organized in June 2017 by the British Institute at Ankara, the American Research Institute in Turkey — Ankara, the embassy of the United States in Ankara and the General Directorate for Heritage and Museums of the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

75. Through their network of heritage professionals, the ICOM Disaster Risk Management Committee and Blue Shield promote best practices to protect and secure cultural property and support capacity-building to develop emergency planning in museums. Recently, the Smithsonian Institution, an active ICOM member, elaborated a data set for the study of the intentional destruction of historical sites. Through a new partnership with the United States Department of State, fieldwork was conducted to document and stabilize the recently liberated ancient city of Nimrud.

2. Measures taken to prevent and counter trafficking in cultural property and related offences

76. Prior to the adoption of resolution 2347 (2017), many Member States began fine-tuning their national legislation, adjusting administrative procedures, particularly in free ports, and raising public awareness of the issue of antiquities smuggling. Several Member States continued reporting on seizures of antiquities, including those potentially related to conflict zones and the financing of terrorism. The work to implement the various provisions of resolution 2347 (2017), in particular the measures outlined in its paragraph 17, will take time. Once implemented, however, these measures have the potential to increase significantly the ability of the international community to counter this threat and the capacity of the global art market to resist attempts to misuse it for illegal activities.

77. Five countries reported on the implementation of concrete measures aimed at identifying trafficking offenses. Armenia conducts comprehensive operative-search measures on the detection and prevention of activities of any organizations, groups and individuals associated with ISIL, the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaida via its National Security Service. Jordan reported using X-ray scanners to uncover smuggling operations. In 2012, Switzerland strengthened the control of imports and exports of cultural objects from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, including those stored in free ports, by using risk profiling. Turkey reported raising awareness with regard to Iraqi and Syrian cultural heritage among its law enforcement and customs authorities. The Russian Federation reported on the monitoring of auctions for listings of stolen cultural objects.

3. Efforts undertaken by Member States with regard to the recovery of cultural heritage

78. Afghanistan continues to work with UNESCO to implement several projects to rehabilitate and recover heritage. It has also established a multi-partner trust fund supporting a national programme for culture and the creative economy.

79. Six "first aid meetings" since 2014 on a wide range of specific aspects of technical recovery have been organized by UNESCO in the Syrian Arab Republic with the support of the Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums of that country. The World Heritage Committee, at its forty-first session, held in Krakow,

Poland, in July 2017, requested that the Syrian Arab Republic invite joint reactive monitoring missions of UNESCO, the International Council on Monuments and Sites and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property to its six World Heritage Sites as soon as the security situation allowed, to assess the state of conservation of the properties and to formulate, in consultation with the State party, measures for their recovery. Since April 2017, UNESCO has had a national officer for culture in Aleppo to ensure coordination with local and national authorities and to follow up on the implementation of recovery actions for the city.

80. Concerning Iraq, an international coordination conference on the safeguarding of cultural heritage in liberated areas of Iraq, organized at UNESCO headquarters in Paris in February 2017, resulted in the mapping of ongoing and planned activities, and the planning of short- and medium-term actions, including the creation of a Baghdad-based joint steering committee responsible for implementing the action plan adopted at the conference. UNESCO is mobilizing funding for implementation of the action plan.

81. Following insurgent attacks on the Nigerian World Heritage property Sukur Cultural Landscape in December 2014, Nigeria submitted a request for international assistance under the UNESCO World Heritage Fund in October 2016 to support the provision of local building materials for its restoration. The project was approved in March 2017.

82. Mali reported the establishment of a conservation and safeguarding programme for all of its World Heritage properties and those on its Tentative List, to which three new properties were added in 2017.

83. Following the sentencing by the International Criminal Court of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi to nine years in prison for intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings, including the mausoleums of saints, in the World Heritage Site of Timbuktu, Mali,[44] the Court's member States, via the trust fund for victims, are reviewing the modalities for the awarding of reparations, assessed at $2.7 million, to the victims of these crimes, notably for moral harm and with a view to supporting the recovery of the affected community.[45] UNESCO is assisting the trust fund in implementing the reparations plan, and is contributing to the elaboration by the Court of a policy on cultural property, participating in a multi-stakeholder expert consultation meeting in July 2017 in The Hague.

4. Protection of cultural property in safe havens within the territory of each Member State

84. France reported incorporating into its law the legal principle of safe havens for the protection of cultural objects at risk from conflict or natural disaster, as well as the designation of a safe haven in France for its own cultural objects, as well as those from other countries, upon request.

[44] International Criminal Court, *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi*, case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, judgment and sentence on the situation in the Republic of Mali, 27 September 2016. Available from www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF.

[45] International Criminal Court, *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi*, case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, reparations order on the situation in the Republic of Mali, 17 August 2017. Available from www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_05117.PDF.

5. Assistance provided for the demining of cultural sites and objects upon the request of affected States

85. The Russian Federation reported on its involvement in the demining of the World Heritage Site of Palmyra via the Anti-Mine Centre of the Russian Armed Forces.

86. Mali reported cooperating with the United Nations Mine Action Service on a general demining programme in the conflict areas affecting its natural and cultural heritage sites.

87. France expressed its readiness to consider requests for support from Member States regarding the demining of cultural sites.

G. Educational and awareness-raising programmes

1. Creation of educational programmes on protecting cultural heritage

88. To increase awareness of the importance of protecting cultural heritage, particularly among children and youth, an increasing number of countries have reported implementing educational and recreational programmes on this subject.

89. Estonia, Japan, Romania, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine reported creating curricula on the protection of cultural heritage through their ministries of education; Ecuador reported that it intended to do the same between 2018 and 2021. Saudi Arabia had approved a comprehensive educational programme on cultural heritage aimed at anchoring culture in daily life.

90. Colombia reported on the creation of a virtual training programme entitled "Vivamos el património". Spain reported on its annual youth programme on heritage.

91. Several Member States, including Estonia and Turkey, have established educational centres within their museums, while others are creating museums with an educational focus. In Afghanistan, the Republic of Korea is supporting the establishment of the Bamiyan Cultural Centre for the promotion of cultural education for the general public. Saudi Arabia is planning the construction of 13 new regional museums.

92. Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Italy, Mali, Romania, Spain and Turkey reported on providing training and educational modules to art market professionals, museum experts, the media and traditional mediators.

93. Estonia, France, Japan and Sweden reported developing awareness-raising material on cultural heritage protection, such as brochures, websites and cartoons.

94. UNESCO also develops and implements educational programmes and activities for the protection of cultural heritage, such as the World Heritage Education Programme, the World Heritage in Young Hands educational resource kit and the World Heritage Youth Forums.

2. Raising public awareness with regard to illicit trafficking and its prevention

95. Member States have undertaken various measures to raise public awareness of illicit trafficking of cultural objects and how to prevent it. Many of these initiatives were conducted in the framework of the #Unite4Heritage campaign, launched by the Director-General of UNESCO at the University of Baghdad in March 2015, which is aimed at fostering global citizenship and tolerance, while addressing a lack of belonging as one of the root causes of radicalization.

96. Bulgaria, Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine reported on disseminating — via the Internet, printed materials, the media and social media — information regarding import and export restrictions governing trade in cultural objects.

97. Italy, France and Sweden have mounted exhibitions on illicit trafficking and the destruction of heritage, and Mexico organized events celebrating the return and restitution of looted or stolen objects. Turkey reported organizing symposiums and conferences on related topics.

98. Switzerland supported the creation of a UNESCO video clip on the protection of cultural heritage aimed at Iraqi youth. With support from Norway, the children's game "Sarmad the Adventurer" was developed to raise awareness of the cultural heritage of Iraq and the importance of protecting it from illicit trafficking. In support of Syrian youth, the University of Tsukuba, in Japan, translated the well-known children's book *A History of Syria in One Hundred Sites* into Arabic, and distributed it in schools within camps for refugees and internally displaced persons in and around the Syrian Arab Republic.

99. As part of a wider initiative to raise awareness of the destruction of heritage in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, UNESCO developed animated videos to inform local communities about actions to be taken to protect their heritage, as well as about the illicit trafficking of Syrian cultural property. UNESCO also raised awareness of illicit trafficking through travel guides and billboards in international airports. In addition, it organized a regional conference entitled "Cultural heritage and identity: an Arab youth perspective", held in Tunisia in March 2017, to promote new models of youth-led and gender-sensitive social and private entrepreneurship.

100. At the eighth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, held from 17 to 21 October 2016, UNODC launched a public awareness campaign on combating trafficking in cultural property.[46] The campaign highlights this form of crime as an urgent transnational threat involving organized criminal networks that requires closer cooperation at the international and national levels.

101. INTERPOL issued a special poster in 2015 for Iraq displaying 94 objects stolen from the Mosul Museum[47] and another poster in January 2017 featuring 22 funerary limestone relief busts stolen from Palmyra, Syrian Arab Republic.[48] ICOM disseminates practical tools such as the ICOM Red Lists of cultural objects at risk (see footnote 14 above) through its worldwide networks.

II. Support for international funding mechanisms

Contributions by Member States to the Heritage Emergency Fund, Second Protocol Fund and the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas to support preventive and emergency operations, as well as fight against the illicit trafficking of cultural property

102. Eight Member States,[49] as well as private individuals, have contributed approximately $2,450,000 to the Heritage Emergency Fund of UNESCO. Additional contributions for the protection of cultural heritage in emergency situations have been made to other UNESCO funding mechanisms.

[46] See unodc.org/culturalproperty.

[47] Accessible from www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Poster/Objects-stolen-from-Mosul-Museum,-Iraq.

[48] Accessible from www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Poster/Sculptures-stolen-in-Palmyra,-Syria.

[49] Andorra, Estonia, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Qatar and Slovakia.

103. Eight State Parties[50] have contributed to the Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, totalling approximately $350,000.

104. Since its launch in December 2016, $75 million has been pledged to the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas[51] from a variety of donors.

I. Support for United Nations peacekeeping operations

105. Based on its cooperation with MINUSMA and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UNESCO is currently developing training modules for peacekeepers on the protection of cultural property. The first regional training for the Southern African Development Community, organized by UNESCO in cooperation with the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare was held in September 2017 with the participation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

106. Italy reported that the protection of cultural heritage was to be among its priorities during its mandate on the Security Council in 2017. Italy intended to support the inclusion of the protection of cultural heritage in the mandates of peacekeeping missions, as well as the establishment of new training activities for peacekeepers, and international and regional forces.

IV. Observations and recommendations

107. Countering looting and the flow of cultural artefacts from conflict zones constitutes a complex task for the international community. Nevertheless, this objective must be pursued, not only to limit the large-scale destruction of cultural heritage but also to prevent terrorist organizations, such as ISIL, from developing new means of financing activities. This will require the continuing engagement of Member States and relevant international organizations, including the strengthening of inter-agency cooperation and coordination across the United Nations system, to provide multidisciplinary training, support and technical assistance to Member States.

108. Concerning the looting and illicit trafficking of cultural objects, the continued sharing of disaggregated data on criminal proceedings and seizures of such objects between United Nations entities and Member States is essential to the monitoring of progress in this area. I encourage such cooperation, especially with a view to making more readily available data on the objects identified, recovered and returned to their origin, as well as on the impact of these efforts on the financing of terrorist groups.

109. Effective measures to counter and report on the threat posed by the looting of artefacts in conflict zones will require stronger cooperation between Member States

[50] Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Slovakia and Switzerland.

[51] The Conference for Safeguarding Cultural Heritage in Conflict Areas, organized by France and the United Arab Emirates in Abu Dhabi in December 2016, resulted in the endorsement of a final declaration by all participants, with several objectives, in particular the establishment of an international fund for the protection of cultural heritage at risk as a result of armed conflict. The bylaws of the fund were registered in Geneva on 8 March 2017. The International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas is a financial institution whose purpose is to attract, mobilize, manage and distribute resources to enable the implementation of prevention programmes and the urgent protection of cultural property under the threat of destruction, damage or looting as a result of armed conflict, and to participate in its rehabilitation.

and the private sector. As highlighted above, the development of mutually agreed standards of provenance certification and documentation, as well as differentiated due diligence procedures, has proven effective. Although such standards would entail adjustments to the operation of the global art market, they can protect it against misuse and close a potential strategic gap in the defence against terrorist financing. I therefore encourage the practice of Member States of adjusting legislation and regulations and introducing due diligence, compliance and know-your-customer procedures to address this issue.

110. Data from market actors and researchers demonstrate that the profit margins for looted antiquities at the first point of sale near conflict zones are small (see S/2016/213, para. 26). Enhancing compliance structures and administrative measures designed to inhibit illicit trade in transit and potential market countries should decrease the commercial viability of looting in conflict zones. Further distribution and use of the International Guidelines for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to Trafficking in Cultural Property and Other Related Offences[57] would help Member States to develop codes of conduct, best practices, training and partnerships with Internet providers and web-based auctioneers and vendors.

111. In addition, greater understanding of terrorist financing risks would help identify the kinds of financial transactions that might be involved in the transport and sale of looted and smuggled artefacts, allowing for more preventive action. To this end, I encourage Member States to consider the provisions of Security Council resolutions 2199 (2015), 2253 (2015) and 2368 (2017) concerning terrorist financing streams, including those which relate to the smuggling of antiquities, as complementary to their implementation of resolution 2347 (2017).

112. As the standard-setting specialized agency for cultural heritage protection, UNESCO plays a central role in supporting the development of documentation standards and tools for cultural heritage. These standards are key to the archiving of materials, the establishment of baseline data and the processes of rehabilitation and recovery. Moreover, in the light of the valuable work undertaken by UNESCO in the context of UNIFIL and MINUSMA, I will encourage United Nations entities and relevant Secretariat departments to consider the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict in their training of personnel, as appropriate, and in their planning processes ahead of mandate renewals or the establishment of new missions. This includes the Syrian Arab Republic, where the protection of cultural heritage, as well as its rehabilitation for post-conflict recovery, would need to be considered as factors in resilience, reconciliation, social cohesion and economic development.

113. Finally, recognizing the importance of protecting cultural heritage as part of the protection of the social and cultural rights of the population is a first step in galvanizing an effective response in this regard. In this light, I welcome the initiative of various Member States to increase awareness and understanding of the importance of protecting cultural property from destruction, looting and illicit trafficking. Further engaging and creating partnerships with civil society, communities and youth through heritage education and other activities that promote respect for cultural diversity, tolerance and inclusive societies would help to harness these national efforts and contribute to long-term efforts to prevent the destruction, looting and illicit trafficking of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.

[57] General Assembly resolution 69/196, annex.

Annex

Status of ratification of international instruments relevant to the implementation of resolution 2347 (2017)

Instrument	Number of States parties	Ratifications or accessions since adoption of resolution 2347 (2017)
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954)	129	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (12 September 2017)
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954)	107	Botswana (23 August 2017) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (12 September 2017)
Second Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1999)	73	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (12 September 2017)
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970)	135	Botswana (23 August 2017) Monaco (25 August 2017) United Arab Emirates (October 2017)
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972)	193	None
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (1995)	41	Bosnia and Herzegovina (8 May 2017) Lao People's Democratic Republic (18 May 2017) Botswana (28 August 2017)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)	128	None
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)	188	Zambia (7 April 2017)
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)	189	Japan (11 July 2017) Fiji (19 September 2017)
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (2001)	57	Kuwait (30 May 2017)
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003)	174	Malta (13 April 2017) Tuvalu (12 May 2017)
United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003)	183	Japan (11 July 2017) Niue (3 October 2017)
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005)	144	None

United Nations S/2017/970

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 November 2017

Original: English

Japan: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2319 (2016), 2235 (2015), 2209 (2015) and 2118 (2013),

1. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism, as set out in resolution 2235, for a period of 30 days, with a possibility of further extension by the Security Council if it deems necessary;

2. *Requests* the UN Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to submit to the Security Council, within 20 days of the adoption of this resolution, proposals for the structure and methodology of the Joint Investigative Mechanism reflecting views of Security Council members;

3. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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